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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic capabilities-based theory of the multinational
enterprise (MNE). It first reviews scholarship on the MNE, with a focus on
what has come to be known as “internalization” theory. One prong of this
theory develops contractual/transaction cost-informed governance perspec-
tives; and another develops technology transfer and capabilities perspectives.
In this paper, it is suggested that the latter has been somewhat neglected.
However, if fully integrated as part of a more complete approach, it can
buttress transaction cost/governance issues and expand the range of phe-
nomena that can be explained. In this more integrated framework, dynamic
capabilities coupled with good strategy are seen as necessary to sustain
superior enterprise performance, especially in fast-moving global environ-
ments. Entrepreneurial management and transformational leadership are
incorporated into a capabilities theory of the MNE. The framework is then
used to explain how strategy and dynamic capabilities together determine
firm-level sustained competitive advantage in global environments. It is
suggested that this framework complements contract-based perspectives on
the MNE and can help integrate international management and international
business perspectives.
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INTRODUCTION
A multinational enterprise (MNE) is a business ﬁrm that sets
strategy and manages operations for the development and utiliza-
tion of income-generating assets in more than one country in
the pursuit of proﬁts over time. A robust theory of the business
enterprise ought to be able to provide insight into global scope,
network characteristics, and the basis of sustained competitive
advantage (SCA), if any. Accordingly, the study of international
business should not be divorced from the study of international
management, and the theory of the MNE should not be a distant
cousin to the theory of the business enterprise more generally.
However, incomplete global integration and the existence of
heterogeneous national economies and geographies leave special
issues and considerations that a theory of the MNE must embrace,
but hasn’t yet done so.
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The theory of the ﬁrm has long contended
with issues such as why ﬁrms exist and what
determines their boundaries. More speciﬁcally,
a robust theory of the ﬁrm should also be able to
explain:
(1) why some ﬁrms grow and go global while some
ﬁrms stay domestic;
(2) the product, as well as geographical identity and
scope, of the ﬁrm’s activities1;
(3) market-entry timing and mode; and
(4) explain the drivers of foreign direct investment
(FDI) and the role of subsidiaries.
Most critically, an acceptable theory of the MNE
should be able to provide insight into how the
enterprise builds and protects SCA.2
This paper endeavors to ﬁll voids and inadequacies
in the theory of the MNE and competitive advantage
by drawing on scholarship on organizational cap-
abilities,3 business strategy, and entrepreneurship.
One goal is to bring greater cohesion to the ﬁeld of
international business by securing convergence
between “internalization scholars” and what I will
call “international management scholars”, such as
Bartlett, Ghoshal, and Doz, who have come to eschew
internalization theories in favor of other approaches.
Another goal is to bring greater integration with the
ﬁeld of strategic management, which also claims to
have something to say about the SCA of global ﬁrms.
A third goal is to respond to the challenge of several
scholars to bring the international business literature
into better contact with entrepreneurship theory.
Mark Casson (1986b: 54) some time ago called for a
“dynamic theory of countries’ advantages using the
economic theory of the entrepreneur”.4 Jones and
Wadhwani (2007: 2) likewise recognized the oppor-
tunity and the need to employ “an entrepreneurial
perspective to deepen our understanding of aspects of
the history of global capitalism”.
A ﬁnal goal is to integrate economic, organiza-
tional, and entrepreneurial theories of the ﬁrm by
demonstrating how both governance and entrepre-
neurship/capabilities perspectives are needed to
shed light on the nature of the MNE, and the
foundations of SCA.5 I agree with my UC Berkeley
colleague Oliver Williamson that capabilities and
governance perspectives are “both rival and comple-
mentary … more the latter than the former”
(Williamson, 1999: 1106). I also submit that the
capabilities view encompasses governance/contrac-
tual views and can provide the framework within
which governance/transaction cost minimization
decisions take place.6
These four goals constitute an ambitious, multi-
disciplinary agenda. That agenda transcends the
deep theoretical issues addressed by Frank Knight
(1921) and by Nobel Laureate Coase (1937).7
The structure of the paper is as follows. It begins
with a review of a number of early approaches to the
theory of the MNE, and then identiﬁes various
shortcomings, with attendant hints as to how one
might amend these deﬁciencies. The direction of
travel is toward a capabilities theory, which is embel-
lished as the paper evolves. The framework is then
applied to classic MNE questions, and exploratory
insights are reviewed. The paper builds upon earlier
efforts to bring capabilities into the theory of the
MNE (Augier & Teece, 2007, 2008; Pitelis & Teece,
2010; Teece, 2006a). Because of the richness in
existing theories in the ﬁeld of international busi-
ness and prior efforts to bridge some of the divides
(e.g., Rugman & Verbeke, 1992, 2003), there is
plenty of good scholarship to draw upon and to
incorporate into the capabilities/entrepreneurship
framework, thereby hopefully creating amore robust
and integrative theory of the MNE, while simulta-
neously blurring the lines between the international
business and international management literatures.
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF THE MNE
The internalization perspective has dominated
much of the literature on the MNE over the past 30
years (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). This perspective
attempts to explain the reasons for international
production and the phenomenon of the MNE by
appealing to “market failure” considerations. Such
“failures” help explain why ﬁrms internalize transac-
tions across national borders. However, the perspec-
tive does not address the reasons for differential ﬁrm
performance.8
The internalization perspective is arguably more
robust than the earlier Hymer–Kindleberger para-
digm. The former is substantially an efﬁciency-based
explanation of FDI and the MNE; the latter a market
power explanation. While Hymer (1968) did note in
one article a speciﬁcally Coasian justiﬁcation for
internalization, he was deeply wedded to standard
theories of the ﬁrm, and to the Mason–Bain struc-
ture–conduct–performance paradigm of industrial
organization (Dunning & Pitelis, 2008). Hymer’s
analysis became impaired when he quickly moved
from determining that the MNE had special advan-
tages to asserting that the exploitation of its mono-
poly power and monopolistic advantages was the
main reason for its existence and evolution, and was
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therefore something to be regulated or otherwise
limited by government controls (Teece, 1981a).9
The internalization school advanced understand-
ing of the MNE beyond where Hymer left it, not least
by emphasizing market failures due to contracting
problems. This led to an efﬁciency-based explana-
tion of the MNE. There are two prongs (rationales) to
internalization:
(1) transaction costs/hold-up issues that are avoided
by internalization; and
(2) resource transfer cost savings and learning
issues, which are facilitated when technology
transfers occur inside the MNE.
The ﬁrst prong was advanced by Buckley and
Casson (1976), Dunning (1981), Rugman (1981),
Teece (1975, 1976, 1981a), Williamson (1981),
and others. This particular internalization “school”
sees contractual issues and associated market fail-
ures as the crucial reason for internalization. This
class of papers can be thought of as representing
the transaction-cost-based, comparative-governance-
based, or exchange-based theory of internaliza-
tion.10 Early contributions in this vein (e.g., Casson,
1979) explicitly viewed it as a two-way street, noting
that internalized transactions could, when circum-
stances warranted, be externalized (outsourced), but
that awareness has generally given way to a narrower
focus on what ﬁrms choose to integrate.
Buckley and Casson’s (1976) work was the most
thorough early attempt in this genre to extend
Coase’s (1937) paper into the global context. They
argued that MNEsminimized transaction costs result-
ing from the public goods aspects of some intermedi-
ate, mostly intangible, assets via global coordination
and themanagerial control of these assets. This prong
of the internalization school examined the relative
advantages associated with different entry modes
(e.g., exports, licensing, and FDI). In this same vein,
Hennart (1982) explored conditions under which
international interdependencies could be dealt
with in a transaction-costs-efﬁcient manner through
employment contracts, rather than arm’s length mar-
ket transactions. Rugman (1981) also highlighted the
role of MNEs in overcoming market imperfections in
international markets.11 This version of the internali-
zation paradigm has become so pervasive that Mark
Casson could quite correctly claim that by the mid-
1980s “the modern theory of the MNE is essentially a
general theory of contractual relations in interna-
tional business” (Casson, 1986a: 6).
The second and relatively neglected prong to
internalization does not see its essence as resulting
from transaction costs saved because hold-up risks
are abated. Rather, it emphasizes the common
(organizational) culture of an integrated enterprise
and the ease of coordination inside the ﬁrm, as
compared with coordination through the market.
Besides easing potential contractual problems, inte-
gration opens pathways to learning, and to sharing
know-how and expertise through cross-border tech-
nology and know-how transfer within the MNE. In
this view, the MNE also provides for easy inter-
change of personnel across borders, and for better
appropriability and trade secrecy. It thus mitigates
intellectual property concerns, too, since technol-
ogy transfer is to wholly owned business units and
not to third parties, purportedly yielding greater
control.
In this second prong of the theory, facilitating
opportunity identiﬁcation, personnel exchanges,
learning, integration, and assisting in technology
transfer are likely to be very important, and cannot
all be squeezed under the rubric of economizing on
transaction costs. The essence of the MNE in this
prong of the literature is less about saving on trans-
action costs and more about being entrepreneurial
and effective in the development, transfer, and
orchestration of differentiated organizational and
technological capabilities (Teece, 1981a). Cantwell
(1989) developed a variant of this prong and called it
the “industrial dynamics” and technological accu-
mulation perspective, as it moved the focus away
from industrial structure toward industrial evolution
in which FDI led to the generation of “fresh techno-
logical advantages” abroad and at home (2).
This second prong has evolved into a knowledge-
based approach to the MNE. Somewhat in the spirit
of Teece (1976, 1977a, 1981a), Kogut and Zander
(1992) saw the MNE as an instrument for generating
and harboring tacit and explicit knowledge, and for
transferring technology and industrial know-how
across borders. In these formulations, the expansion
of enterprise boundaries required and facilitated the
transfer of knowledge. Internal knowledge transac-
tions are preferred, not primarily for transaction cost
reasons, but because of the lower resource costs of
transmitting knowledge internally vs across a market
(Tallman, 2003; Teece, 1976, 1977a). In Kogut and
Zander’s model, opportunism is rejected as an
ongoing factor because ﬁrms exist to provide a social
community supporting voluntaristic actions.
Both prongs of internalization provide important
and relevant insights into the MNE. Cantwell (1989)
was early to recognize the need to combine con-
tractual frameworks with a theory of capability
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development. Notwithstanding his early contribu-
tions, international business scholarship has left cap-
abilities considerations underdeveloped, to its
considerable detriment (e.g., Birkinshaw & Hood,
1998; Cantwell, 2009; Langlois, 2007). Because of
the shortcomings of the ﬁrst prong set out in the next
section, the time is now ripe for the second prong (i.
e., capabilities) to be strengthened, augmented with
entrepreneurial considerations, and linked to a trans-
action-cost-based comparative governance perspec-
tive.12 Once this is accomplished, the second prong
ought to be sufﬁciently robust to serve as the structure
within which the transaction cost perspective can be
nested.
SOME SHORTCOMINGS OF NAKED
TRANSACTION-COST-BASED THEORIES OF THE
MNE
In this section, I ﬁrst highlight some shortcomings of
the quasi-neoclassical transaction-cost-comparative
governance perspective, and then provide hints as
to how these can be remedied.13 Subsequent sec-
tions aim to provide a combined entrepreneurial/
capabilities conceptual perspective within which
transaction costs can be contained.
Capabilities and Learning Unexplored
Early contributions to internalization, such as Hymer
(1976), Buckley and Casson (1976), and, to some
extent, Williamson (1981), drew to varying degrees
on neoclassical marginal analysis and ignored or
underplayed the importance of dynamics and, in
particular, learning and capability augmentation.
Even when the framework was broadened to include
additional phenomena, capabilities and learning were
neglected. For instance, in explaining the boundaries
of the MNE, John Dunning (1995) suggested that
ownership and location matter along with internali-
zation factors (his OLI model). Buckley and Casson
(1998) seemed to accept these elements, too. In sub-
sequent work, moreover, Buckley and Casson have
endeavored to address dynamics, innovation, ﬂexibil-
ity, real options, international entrepreneurship, joint
ventures and cultural issues. They have not, however,
embraced issues of capabilities in a robust manner.
Buckley (forthcoming) summarizes this impressive
work and explains why behavioral and sociological
views are hard to integrate with internalization, as
they do not follow the rational choice axioms. While
the challenge is considerable, the goal (theoretical
integration) is attainable. Earlier work by Teece (1982)
shows that transaction-cost-type and capabilities-type
theories can coexist. Furthermore, one possible
interpretation of the ownership factor in Dunning
is that it is a proxy for capabilities (albeit a static one,
particularly in early iterations of the OLI model).14 It
is clear that initial steps toward a capabilities
approach have already been taken.
However, even if Dunning’s ownership factor is
interpreted as embracing ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors and
national institutions (systems of innovation and pro-
duction), and even if the ownership factor is accepted
as a proxy for ﬁrm-level capabilities, there is still
a dearth of theoretical structure and content around
their nature, origins, orchestration, replicability/
transferability, and imitability. This is because
neither transaction-cost-based internalization theory
nor OLI explains very well the sources of ﬁrm-level
asset ownership and capability advantages vis-à-vis
competitors. While capabilities are obviously built
in large part through learning, the O factor in Dunn-
ing has little to say about that (Pitelis, 2007).15 It
is important to recognize that learning is a key
mechanism by which ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets develop.16
In more recent writing, Dunning and Lundan use
the path-dependent resources and capabilities of a
ﬁrm and its institutional infrastructure to explain
dynamic growth, and highlight the need to link the
microstructure of capabilities to the evolution of the
(institutional) macrostructure (Cantwell, Dunning, &
Lundan, 2010; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Although
this recent scholarship has been helpful in enhancing
our understanding of the dynamics of the internaliza-
tion process of ﬁrms, large gaps nevertheless exist.
The theory of technological accumulation discussed
in Cantwell (1989) remains an important mechanism
by which ﬁrms build technological capabilities. How-
ever, given the ever-greater global dispersion of tech-
nology, reliance on in-house R&D as the sole basis of
competitive advantage is no longer tenable. Technol-
ogies from both within and beyond the enterprise
must be orchestrated effectively to achieve timely
delivery of differentiated products and services
that customers value (Augier &Teece, 2007; Pitelis,
2004).
Cross-Border Market Creation and Co-Creation
Ignored
Market creation and co-creation are both entrepre-
neurial and dynamic concepts that have always been
seminal functions of the MNE. However, market
creation and co-creation have been largely ignored
in the ﬁrst (transaction cost) prong of the internali-
zation literature. These activities are very different
from market-entry mode selection decisions, upon
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which MNE theory has in recent decades put so
much emphasis (e.g., Brouthers, 2013; Hennart,
2009; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000).
The transaction cost approach to internalization
theory has focused on entry mode – such as procure-
ment/supply contracts, joint ventures, and wholly
owned subsidiaries. To explain entry mode, transac-
tion cost theory implicitly assumes preexisting mar-
kets, which “fail” under certain conditions (e.g.,
where asset speciﬁcity or complex know-how trans-
fers are involved), necessitating the emergence of the
MNE and FDI to address these failures by internaliz-
ing (under a management structure) transactions
that would otherwise likely evolve in an unfavorable
way for one of the parties. However, it has long been
recognized that the market failure assumption is
merely an analytic convenience. Markets only fail
relative to a hypothetical perfect market, which
rarely exists. Infatuation with market failure and the
functions (or lack thereof) of markets has deﬂected
attention away from more important issues around
the very existence of markets. Market creation and
co-creation functions are not merely a response to a
market that has somehow failed to perform (relative
to an idealistic standard). Rather, it is often the case
that the market has quite simply failed to emerge
and/or needs to be created or co-created (Pitelis &
Teece, 2010) by entrepreneurially managed business
enterprises.17
Put differently, even if markets do exist, they may
be very thin or otherwise imperfect. This is particu-
larly true for more specialized, idiosyncratic, and
uncertain demand-and-supply requirements and
opportunities.18 Hence, rather than solving transac-
tional difﬁculties by simply internalizing all activity,
entrepreneurial MNE managers must often consider
what is tantamount to creating markets for ideas or
for products, and bolstering the capabilities of sup-
pliers in order to have markets they can sell into or
from which they can source raw materials and
components. A market creation and co-creation
view of the MNE is obviously rather different from
contractual approaches.19
It follows from the above that the rationale for the
MNE is not just to achieve efﬁciencies (relative to some
external benchmark) from internal transfers of tech-
nology and intermediate products, but also to create
andmanage co-specialization and, if need be, to create
new markets and expand old ones. Indeed, it is
recognized elsewhere in this paper that a prime reason
why MNEs exist is that their cross-border pres-
ence, entrepreneurial capacities, and organizational
capabilities are integral to the market creation and co-
creation process, both upstream and downstream, and
also laterally.
Some consideration of market creation is already
present in Casson’s important work on entrepre-
neurship (Casson, 1982, 1997, 2005). However,
market-making in his theory is rather neoclassical,
overly focused on individual action, and not
linked very well to the MNE. In particular, Casson’s
approach does not seem to recognize the importance
of the capabilities of the enterprise and its manage-
ment in shaping markets, inﬂuencing trends, shap-
ing demand, and assembling the complements
needed for new markets to be viable.
The reality that needs to be reﬂected in the theory
is that entrepreneurial MNEs can help build the new
ecosystems within which global ﬁrms operate. MNEs
facilitate investment in complements and other
infrastructure needed for new products to be
launched successfully. By investing in complements,
MNEs can enhance the vitality of particular business
ecosystems. Ecosystems are thus partly endogenous,
as they are often co-created by (global) companies.20
This is in contrast to Porter (1980, 1985) and the basic
industrial economics model, which has the industry
as the domain of analysis, and market structure
determined exogenously. In this paper, the concept
of ecosystems (not the industry) is advanced as the
appropriate domain for competitive analysis.
Entrepreneurship Suppressed, Equilibrium
Assumed, Management Muted, Leadership
Ignored
The Coasian view of the ﬁrm has resources allocated
and decisions made by a manager who internalizes
transactions until an indifference point is reached
where the marginal cost of internalization is equal to
the marginal cost of relying on the market. These
perspectives employ neoclassical tools (bothmarginal
analysis and equilibrium concepts) to explain man-
agement behavior and the nature of the enterprise.
Moreover, factors of production and technology are
given, and prices are (implicitly) known. The eco-
nomic problem (or business model choice) becomes
one of whether to engage in market exchange or in
(vertical) integration. In a cross-border context, the
latter implies FDI.21 In the Coasian ﬁrm, there is at
best a modest role for the manager, no room for the
entrepreneur, and no need for the leader.
Williamson (1981, 1985) extended Coase by dee-
pening the contractual underpinnings of the trans-
action cost framework. In so doing, he created a
predictive model of ﬁrm boundaries by featuring the
role of asset speciﬁcity. In Williamson’s contractual
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schema, bounded rationality coupled with uncer-
tainty leads to an inordinate number of potential
contingencies, which in turn render complete con-
tingent-claims contracting impossible. Contracts are
therefore necessarily incomplete. This in turn leads
to recontracting hazards. These are mitigated, if not
eliminated, by internalization. Location issues are
not addressed, except indirectly (i.e., inasmuch as
they impact transaction cost).22
In short, in endeavoring to build a theory of the
ﬁrm, neither Coase nor Williamson focused on the
important role the business enterprise plays in search-
ing for and/or developing new opportunities, either
at home or abroad. Nor did they feature learning or
leadership. Rather, the evolution of the enterprise
(including the MNE) is due, in these frameworks, to
management’s desire to minimize transaction costs,
and in particular to guard against opportunism.
Opportunity, on the other hand, is almost completely
neglected.
Organizational change is also missing. What lim-
ited change there is – Williamson’s “fundamental
transformation” being perhaps the main exemplar –
is not due to entrepreneurship or innovation. Rather,
it arises from past investments that are “held up” (i.e.,
rent is extracted) because of extortionate recontract-
ing by opportunistic contractual partners who take
advantage of changes in bargaining positions once
idiosyncratic investments have been made.
Put differently, internalization theories, to the
extent to which they rely on Coase and Williamson,
posit ubiquitous contractual problems, which in
turn lead to “market failures”. Internalization over-
comes these problems primarily by changing gov-
ernance structures. Entrepreneurial and managerial
functions such as opportunity discovery, learning,
and knowledge creation play almost no role in their
analyses. Neither entrepreneurship nor leadership is
needed or featured.
In reality, however, entrepreneurs and entrepre-
neurial managers working in an organizational con-
text discover and create new knowledge and help
commercialize new technologies at home and
abroad. They learn about new opportunities, and
sometimes help create them and transfer technolo-
gies as needed. Because the market for information/
knowledge about new opportunities (Gans & Stern,
2010; Teece, 1981b) isn’t well developed, entrepre-
neurs and managers must build organizational
capabilities inside businesses ﬁrms to assist in knowl-
edge creation and knowledge capture (Teece, 1986b,
2006b). To be effective, such ﬁrms often need to be
global in scope. The neglect of these entrepreneurial/
managerial functions in the theory of the ﬁrm would
appear to be a serious omission.23 The neglect of the
role of the leader, particularly in organizational
transformation, is equally serious.
“Control” Follows Ownership of (Foreign)
Subsidiaries; Inter-Firm Relationships Enigmatic
Most “governance”-based theories of FDI implicitly
assume, or explicitly state (e.g., Hennart, 2010), that
strategic control comes through ownership and
resides with the parent, that getting incentives right
is not only necessary but sufﬁcient to achieve align-
ment of goals and economic efﬁciency, and that
subsidiaries are just that. In isolation, and putting
ﬁnancial constraints to one side, this view of the
MNE tends to see the wholly owned subsidiaries as
the preferred organizational form, because protect-
ing speciﬁc assets from recontracting hazards is the
main purpose of the MNE.24
In reality, the common ownership of business
units doesn’t eliminate incentive problems, nor does
it necessarily achieve control. This is particularly
true in the MNE context, where the identiﬁcation of
host countries’ employees with the MNE shareholder
is less than perfect. This is well recognized by interna-
tional business scholars; but the internalization the-
ory of the MNE struggles to ﬁnd an elegant way to
take this into account. If asset ownership is neither
necessary nor sufﬁcient for incentive alignment, as
Helper and Sako (2012) suggest, then internalization
theory must somehow be modiﬁed if it is to capture
the essence of the MNE. Certainly, evidence that
MNEs choose to internalize in order to guard against
recontracting hazards is weak at best.25
The business historian Alfred Chandler was one of
the ﬁrst to identify the structural virtues of a fully
integrated ﬁrm that was global in scope. In his para-
digm, (vertical) integration was necessary to achieve
coordination (Chandler, 1977). However, cross-border
communication technology has improved dramati-
cally in recent decades, and capabilities are more
globally dispersed than ever. As a result, coordination
in the supply chain seems to be less dependent on
internalization than it once was. The implications for
internalization theories are considerable.
Consider Apple, which is known for the ingenuity
of its designs, yet it owns none of its own manufac-
turing. It has tight supply relations with many com-
panies – some pure contractors (e.g., Foxconn,
headquartered in Taiwan with factories in China)
and at least one competitor (Samsung, headquartered
in Korea). Apple helps provide ﬁnancing to some of
its suppliers, and may obtain exclusive purchase
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arrangements from them for short periods (e.g., three
years). Contractual arrangements appear to sufﬁce for
Apple to achieve the necessary coordination, while
retaining the ﬂexibility needed to respond to market
forces. Powerful examples of heavily outsourced com-
panies, such as Apple, serve to remind us that stan-
dard contractual approaches to internalization need
to be combined with, and arguably embedded into,
entrepreneurial, capability, and “network” paradigms
of the ﬁrm.
These outsourcing arrangements have been stu-
died under several names, including “international
production networks” (e.g., Ernst & Guerrieri, 1998)
and “global value chains” (e.g., Gerefﬁ, Humphrey,
& Sturgeon, 2005). Buckley introduced the expres-
sion “global factory” to characterize a network in
which “Brand owners will control design, engineer-
ing and marketing while outsourcing large areas of
production to parts suppliers and they may well
contract out ﬁnal assembly” (Buckley, 2007: 115).
Buckley claims that his global factory network is
“held together by control of key assets and ﬂows of
knowledge and intermediate products” (Buckley,
2009: 230). The global (virtual) factory concept
appears to be the structure selected by Buckley to
accommodate notions of dynamic capabilities.
Competitive Advantage Neglected
As Geoffrey Jones notes, “the recognition that multi-
nationals are profoundly heterogeneous is one of
the most important lessons from history” (Jones,
2005: 289). The theory of the multinational ﬁrm in
economics – and transaction cost theory is no
exception – does not deal effectively with this
heterogeneity, and hence cannot address issues
relating to competitive advantage, that is, the foun-
dation for enterprise- or business-level ﬁnancial
performance that is both superior (“supernormal”)
and durable. While different governance forms are
seen as suitable for certain transaction types, the
framework is silent as to how competitive advantage
is built and preserved for particular ﬁrms. It is true
that the invention of new and superior governance
modes can be a source of temporary competitive
advantage, but, as a general matter, there is no easy
way to protect innovations in governance from
rapid imitation. Hence, governance advantages will
erode, sometimes rather quickly.
Moreover, thanks to the very development of
transaction cost economics and its wide dissemina-
tion, knowledge of the tools of good governance is
available in the public domain. Adoption of good
governance protocols may of course be impaired by
factors inside the enterprise. If so, new governance
modes may serve to create differentiation. But trans-
action cost analysis does not contribute signiﬁcant
insights into when and where this is the case.
Accordingly, it is of limited relevance to scholars
and practitioners seeking an understanding of com-
petitive advantage.
Neglect of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity and the parti-
culars of competitive advantage is perhaps the pri-
mary reason for the schism between the ﬁelds of
international business and international (strategic)
management. The former largely ignores it; the latter
embraces it. Until this chasm is bridged, interna-
tional business scholars will have little to say to
managers, and international management scholars
will have little to contribute to public policy or the
understanding of national competitiveness.
TOWARD A CAPABILITIES THEORY OF THEMNE
Antecedents: Resources and Early Capabilities
Perspectives
Internalization theories have yielded important
insights into the MNE. This is true with respect to
both prongs of the approach. However, as the inter-
national business ﬁeld has matured, and as the
theory of the ﬁrm in economics has evolved, rela-
tively neglected (capabilities-related) factors now
seem more salient. My early efforts to understand
international technology transfer, which were made
under the internalization rubric (e.g., Teece, 1976,
1977a), used elements of a capabilities story that
transcended transaction costs. However, in these
early treatments, capabilities considerations were
soon swamped by contractual concerns (Teece,
1985, 1986a). This needs to be readdressed in my
own work, as well as in the literature at large.
A capability is the capacity to utilize resources to
perform a task or an activity, against the opposition of
circumstance. Essentially, capabilities ﬂow from the
astute bundling or orchestration of resources. The
organizational and managerial “technology” of the
ﬁrm and its ability to transfer technology (embedded
in routines and resources) across distances and bor-
ders are very much implicated in the ﬁrm’s national
and global capabilities.
The (dynamic) capabilities framework is an entre-
preneurial approach that emphasizes the importance
of (signature) business processes, both inside the
ﬁrm and also in linking the ﬁrm to external partners.
It also recognizes the importance of critical resources
and good strategy. It is not animated primarily by
transaction cost or contractual concerns. Rather, it
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builds on the resource-based approach. It is focused
more on opportunity than on opportunism, and on
the efﬁcient and effective transfer of technology
between and among the various organizational units
of the ﬁrm.
Teece (1980, 1982) explored Penrose’s ideas of
resource fungibility by assessing how the nature of a
resource, and in particular its “tradability” (or lack of
it), affected diversiﬁcation. A ﬁrm with excess factor
services (i.e., above those needed for its current and
projected production program) may ﬁnd it more
proﬁtable to monetize those services via a new use
rather than through amarket transaction.While this
research focused on product diversiﬁcation, it was
also applicable to international diversiﬁcation.
What has been missing is systematic attention to
how (entrepreneurial) management can deploy or
redeploy the nontradable assets and resources at its
disposal. Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991) began
the task of ﬁlling this gap, building on Penrose’s
view that making better use of resources was impor-
tant to enterprise growth and development. Penrose
herself viewed entrepreneurship as one of the
resources of the ﬁrm, stating, “[W]e include ‘entre-
preneurs’ among the resources of the ﬁrm and the
range of ideas of entrepreneurs among the services
rendered” (Penrose, 1959: 86). In this regard, she was
perhaps describing a dynamic capability, at least in
the sense referred to here.
Despite Penrose’s abiding interest in the interna-
tional ﬁrm, she did not pay particular attention to
the application of her theory to the case of the MNE
(Pitelis, 2007). Moreover, although Penrose did recog-
nize the importance of entrepreneurship, she did not
fully address the roles of entrepreneurs in designing
business models or organizations (Augier & Teece,
2007), or in building competitive advantage. Rather it
was Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1986, 1991) who
articulated the relationships among ﬁrm resources
and competitive advantage. They focused on the
possession of the right resources as themainmechan-
ism for the generation of economic rent. The
resources to worry about were deﬁned by Barney
(1991) as those meeting his criteria of valuable, rare,
inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN). Implicitly,
Barney was inviting strategists to focus on intellectual
capital (Teece, 2000), since this is the class of assets
that most frequently meets the VRIN criteria.
As already noted, Teece (1976, 1977a) and
Cantwell (1989) early on had threads of a resource
and capabilities approach under development. This
initially manifested itself as a knowledge-based
approach to the MNE with Teece (1981a,1981b) and
Kogut and Zander (1992, 1995). However, knowl-
edge-based approaches – which emphasize how the
generation and transfer of knowledge, along with
transaction cost problems in the market for know-
how, dictate integration and/or foreign ownership –
are insufﬁciently robust to capture many relevant
entrepreneurial and capabilities features. Interest-
ingly, recent work in international business (some
of it generated by advocates of the transaction-cost-
based or exchange-based paradigm) has already
begun to focus on an entrepreneurial/capabilities
approach (e.g., Buckley, 2009; Casson, 2000, 2005;
Dunning & Lundan, 2010;26 Pitelis, 2004; Pitelis &
Teece, 2010; Rugman & Verbeke, 2003). It is now
time to carry these efforts forward on a comprehen-
sive basis into a (dynamic capabilities-based entre-
preneurial) theory of the MNE.27
A robust theory of the MNE that explains its scope,
its boundaries, and the role of subsidiaries, while also
providing insights into the competitive advantage of
particular MNEs, requires that the entrepreneurship,
resources, and capabilities concepts be somehow
amalgamated. The (dynamic) capabilities approach,
advanced in the ﬁeld of strategic management and
applied below in the context of the MNE, endeavors
to do so, and is the subject matter of most of the
remainder of the paper. The goal is to help shape a
more robust theory of the MNE that highlights how
ﬁrm-level sustainable (durable) competitive advan-
tage is both built and maintained.
Understanding sustainable competitive advantage
(and not just the boundaries of the ﬁrm) is a broader
mandate for a theory of the MNE than what inter-
nalization scholars typically accept. Coming up with
a better theory of the MNE that does double duty
(i.e., explains boundaries and competitive advan-
tage) requires a comprehensive, multidisciplinary
approach to understanding managerial decision-
making and business organization in a context
where intangible assets are important, and where
there are rapid changes, frequent discontinuities,
and great complexity, engendered in part by the fact
that the world’s needs and desires have not (yet)
become irrevocably homogenized.28 Labor is not
fully mobile, and many national institutions remain
distinct. The world is, and is likely to remain, only
semiglobalized (Ghemawat, 2003). It is this world of
ﬁrm-level heterogeneity and semiglobalization – and
not the hypothetical worlds of perfect competition
or oligopoly – that animates the inquiry here.
The capabilities framework resonates well with
Cantwell’s (1989) work.29 Cantwell recognized, cor-
rectly, that a theory of theMNE based on an exchange
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(or transaction cost/governance) framework masks
any active role for management (Cantwell, 1989:
215). He also argued that ownership advantages are
endogenous and developed through innovation and
strategy, and showed howMNEs extend their capabil-
ities and their overall innovation potential using
global networks.
The capabilities perspective can also be seen as
consistent with other international business litera-
ture, including recent thinking on knowledge man-
agement in a networked MNE (e.g., Rugman &
D’Cruz, 2000; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001, 2002,
2003; Vahlne & Johanson, 2013). As noted earlier,
some knowledge-based theories of the MNE can be
thought of as special cases of a resources/capabilities
theory of the MNE. An essential characteristic of
organizations/ﬁrms is that they can generate and
embody knowledge, which can’t be easily bought
and sold. Sometimes the only way to capitalize on
knowledge is to start a ﬁrm and build the necessary
complementary assets (Teece, 1986b, 2006b). To
fully capitalize on opportunities, such ﬁrms must
often be global from the beginning. In short, cap-
abilities generally have to be built, as they cannot be
bought.
The dynamic capabilities framework developed
below goes beyond the knowledge and technological
elements highlighted in earlier research to more
explicitly include managerial and organizational
capabilities as determinants of competitive advan-
tage. It contends that the active development and
astute orchestration of tangible and intangible assets
by both parent and subsidiaries lie at the heart of the
rationale for the MNE and, together with strategy,
determine its longer-run success.30
Deﬁnitions and Core Building Blocks
The original deﬁnition of dynamic capabilities by
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997: 516) referred to the
ability of an organization and its management to
integrate, build, and reconﬁgure internal and exter-
nal competencies to address rapidly changing envir-
onments.31 Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) extended
this to also embrace what I refer to as “shaping the
environment”.
Teece et al. (1997) identiﬁed the core building
blocks of dynamic capabilities under the tripartite
rubrics of processes, positions, and paths. This was
supplemented in Teece (2007) by a more applied
focus organized around sensing, seizing, and trans-
forming. In what follows, I relate the two taxonomies,
and then show how strategy ﬁts in. Important clarify-
ing distinctions between ordinary and dynamic
capabilities are made. Application to the MNE
follows.
Processes
Teece et al. (1997) identiﬁed three classes of processes/
managerial functions that are relevant to dynamic
capabilities under the following rubrics: coordina-
tion/integration; guided learning; and reconﬁgura-
tion/transformation. Organizational processes embed
the strategy and business model of the business into
the day-to-day routines of employees. The effective-
ness of organizational routines is buttressed by
strong and consistent organizational values.
Dynamic capabilities thus reside, at least in part, in
the managerial, entrepreneurial, and leadership
skills of the ﬁrm’s top management, and in manage-
ment’s ability to design, develop, implement, and
modify these routines. Either way, ﬁrms with super-
ior dynamic capabilities have learned to adjust to
changing environments, and also to shape the (busi-
ness) environment.
Positions (resources)32
As noted earlier, the asset positioning of a company
matters. I am referring not just to balance sheet
assets (plant and equipment and the like) but also
to human capital and knowledge assets. Teece
et al. (1997) identiﬁed technological assets, comple-
mentary assets (technological or otherwise), ﬁnan-
cial assets, reputational assets, market structure
assets, and institutional assets. It is obvious that a
road construction company will need access to
heavy equipment (e.g., bulldozers and dump trucks),
and a home-building company will need access to
architectural services, as well as construction tools
and skilled and unskilled labor. A bank will need
ﬁnancial assets, and the talent to build and run
systems for loan origination and underwriting, etc.
The ﬁrm’s position, as deﬁned by its resources, is
enhanced if the resources meet Barney’s VRIN cri-
teria. As I have noted elsewhere (Teece, 2000), the
class of assets most likely to satisfy VRIN criteria is
intellectual capital, particularly technology and
know-how. Intellectual capital readily meets most
of the VRIN criteria because it tends to be tacit and
idiosyncratic, and has fuzzy edges. In essence, the
criteria distinguish between ubiquitous resources
available to all at competitive prices and those that
are more speciﬁc or unique. Furthermore, the VRIN
criteria recognize that a unique asset is not valuable
for its own sake. It delivers value to the ﬁrm and its
stakeholders only if it supports a point of difference
that is appealing to the customer, and which,
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furthermore, cannot easily be replicated by others
with different assets.
Needless to say, it should be immediately apparent
that, in fast-paced competitive environments, posi-
tions/resources alone are generally of ﬂeeting value.
The way assets need to be deployed (usually in
clusters or combinations) is likely to be dynamic
and involve astute and entrepreneurial “orchestra-
tion” activity by management. As noted in Teece et
al. (1997: 515):
The global competitive battles in high-technology indus-
tries… have demonstrated the need for an expanded para-
digm to understand how competitive advantage is achieved.
Well-known companies… have followed a “resource-based
strategy” of accumulating valuable technology assets… How-
ever, this strategy is often not enough to support a signiﬁcant
competitive advantage.
Clearly, the manner in which assets and other
resources are coordinated and orchestrated is at least
as important to competitive success as the identity of
the assets themselves. This is where asset orchestra-
tion and market creation (or co-creation) come into
play (Pitelis & Teece, 2010). Whereas neoclassical
and transaction cost economics assume that markets
exist, even if they don’t function well, the capabil-
ities approach makes no such assumption. Markets
may have to be created, in the sense that new
products and services are introduced for which
after-sales support and product training, for
instance, may be lacking and may have to be built.
This is what Singer did globally to allow market
development of the sewing machine. In India, Gill-
ette has likewise been promoting the beneﬁts of
removing beards in order to broaden the market for
its safety razors. The need for such creation activities
to expand markets is assumed away in transaction-
based approaches, where there is almost always a
party (or customer) to transact with. This reduces the
problem to one of contracts, when in fact the
fundamental problem may be one of market exis-
tence or market expansion.
The problem stems in part from what was referred
to earlier as the equilibrium assumption. In a “per-
fect” world of markets (spot, term, future, etc.), the
ﬁrm has full information about competitors, about
complementors in investment decisions, and about
what consumers really want. But, in reality, much of
this information is proprietary, tacit, or diffuse, and
thus inaccessible. The decision to invest depends on
sensing an opportunity and also on sensing how
potential competitors and complementors will
respond. This is not a capability required in a
neoclassical world of perfect competition.
The focus of the dynamic capabilities framework is
on how ﬁrms can create, extend, integrate, modify,
and deploy their resources and/or speciﬁc assets while
simultaneously managing competitive threats and
effectuating necessary transformations.33 Whereas
other approaches emphasize tangible asset/resource
ownership and protection, the dynamic capabilities
perspective emphasizes intangible assets and resource
augmentation, and also asset orchestration.
By embedding (managerial) asset orchestration
into the theory of the MNE, the ﬁeld of international
business can build bridges to topics in international
management.
Paths (strategy)
It is important to recognize that strategy must go
hand in hand with processes, resources (positions),
and capabilities. Strategy, when developed success-
fully, involves deploying the ﬁrm’s scarce assets to
support market needs and gain advantage over
rivals, while recognizing market and technological
opportunities and any constraints imposed by the
ﬁrm’s historical path of evolution.
Put differently, the managerial orchestration that
is core to enhancing processes and exploiting posi-
tions must be guided and informed by strategy – and
vice versa.34 Strategy needs to be consistent, coher-
ent, and embrace innovation. While it is necessarily
shaped by the legacy of the past, it also shapes the
path ahead. Strategy will determine which products
to make, which customers to target, how to deploy
the ﬁrm’s resources, what the optimal timing will be,
and how to keep competitors at bay.
A strategy can be deﬁned as “a coherent set of
analyses, concepts, policies, arguments, and actions
that respond to a high-stakes challenge” (Rumelt,
2011: 6). A good strategy has:
(1) prescient diagnoses;
(2) a guiding policy; and
(3) coherent action.
These three functions constitute what Rumelt
(2011) calls the “kernel of strategy”.35 A good strat-
egy will often not appear fully formed, but instead
emerge after a period of trial and error (provided the
business environment is sufﬁciently forgiving to
allow experimentation). While the actions dictated
by the strategy may be visible to rivals, and freely
imitable, rivals may not perceive it in their interest
to do so until it is too late, because the underlying
diagnosis and policy can be kept secret.
In the framework advanced here, dynamic
capabilities and business strategies codetermine
A capabilities-based theory of the MNE David J Teece
17
Journal of International Business Studies
performance.36 Firms with weaker capabilities will
require different strategies from ﬁrms with stronger
capabilities. Strong dynamic capabilities require
ﬁrms to sense, seize, and transform in conjunction
with a sound strategy. A sound strategy must in turn
have a strong kernel.
For purposes of operationalizing the framework,
dynamic capabilities can usefully be disaggregated
into three clusters of processes and entrepreneurial/
managerial orchestration activities conducted inside
ﬁrms (Teece, 2007):
(1) identiﬁcation and assessment of opportunities at
home and abroad (sensing);
(2) mobilization of resources globally to address
opportunities, and to capture value from doing
so (seizing); and
(3) continued renewal (transforming).
These activities are required of the ﬁrm’s manage-
ment if the ﬁrm is to sustain itself as markets and
technologies change. In a global context, the MNE’s
management must not only be entrepreneurial, but
also cosmopolitan, or what Perlmutter (1969) called
“geocentric”.
It is important to emphasize that the framework
advanced here sees the effectiveness of dynamic
capabilities as being compromised by poor strategy.
Strategy and dynamic capabilities can be seen as
analytically distinct concepts, although they are
in practice interrelated (Table 1). For instance, sen-
sing is important to dynamic capabilities but also
contains a strong element of diagnosis, which is
important to strategy; seizing needs to be connected
to both a guiding policy and coherent action; and
transforming that is value protecting and enhancing
requires a guiding policy and coherent action. The
nature of the managerial tasks for various elements
of strategy is outlined in Table 1. Entrepreneurial
management is especially relevant to the ﬁrm’s
ability to be prescient and sense opportunities and
threats (both market- and technology-related).
Replicability and Imitability: Ordinary vs Dynamic
Capabilities
In the dynamic capabilities framework, considerable
emphasis is placed on the replicability and
imitability of organizational processes and positions
(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Clearly, if one is
interested in sustainable competitive advantage, one
needs to take imitability into account. That which is
easily replicated by the ﬁrm is scalable, possibly
globally.37 However, that which is easily imitated
by others will clearly not be able to support superior
ﬁnancial returns. When examining competitive
advantage, it is therefore critical to distinguish
between “ordinary” (and easily replicable) capabil-
ities and dynamic capabilities, which by their very
nature are hard to replicate. As explained below,
ordinary capabilities support technical ﬁtness, while
dynamic capabilities support evolutionary ﬁtness.
The former is about the enterprise “doing things
right;” the latter has more to do with “doing the
right things”.
Ordinary capabilities: Foundations
It is perhaps easier to understand what dynamic
capabilities are as a class by juxtaposing them against
ordinary capabilities.38 Ordinary capabilities can be
broken into operational, administrative, and govern-
ance capabilities (Teece, forthcoming). Here I empha-
size that ordinary capabilities are about producing
and selling a deﬁned (and static) set of products and
services. The degree of proﬁciency, however obtained,
indicates the strength of the ordinary capability, for
which practice often makes perfect.
Ordinary capabilities simply allow an existing
product or service to be made, sold, and serviced.
They will not necessarily permit the MNE to grow
except in environments with low competition, no
technological disruptions, and very limited globali-
zation.39 When local capabilities in jurisdictions
where MNEs operate are weak relative to those the
MNE can transfer to an afﬁliate, ordinary capabilities
may nevertheless allow an MNE to possess competi-
tive advantages for indeﬁnite periods.
Ordinary capabilities and their diffusion matter to
the MNE.40 They undergird the MNE’s technical
ﬁtness. Technical ﬁtness41 supports static efﬁcien-
cies; but unless competition is very weak, and
demand is strong,42 ordinary capabilities are unli-
kely to support durable competitive advantage. Such
capabilities allow an organization to keep “earning
Table 1 The interrelation of dynamic capabilities and strategy
Strategy kernel Diagnosis Guiding policy Coherent action
Related dynamic capabilities clusters Sensing Seizing/Transformation Seizing/Transformation
Nature of managerial orchestration Entrepreneurial Administrative Leadership
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its living by producing and selling the same product,
on the same scale and to the same customer popula-
tion over time” (Winter, 2003: 992).
Ordinary capabilities enable the ﬁrm to perform
deﬁnable tasks. They rest on (1) non-VRIN resources
and (2) practices, even best practices. The level of
ordinary capabilities can therefore be measured
against a particular task or standard. “Best practice”,
in a sense, does precisely that.43 Best management
practices, for example, can be thought of as those
that “continuously collect and analyze performance
information, that set challenging and interlinked
short- and long-run targets, and that reward high
performers and retrain/ﬁre low performers” (Bloom,
Genakos, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2012).44 Many best
practices, however, diffuse rather quickly in a world
where everyone has access to similar benchmarks.
Bob Lutz (2011), the former vice chairman at Gen-
eral Motors, illustrates this point for the automotive
industry:
The operations portion of the automobile business has been
thoroughly optimized overmany decades, doesn’t varymuch
from one automobile company to another, and can be
managed with a focus on repetitive process. It is the “hard”
part of the car business and requires little in the way of
creativity, vision or imagination. Almost all car companies do
this very well, and there is little or no competitive advantage
to be gained by “trying even harder” in procurement,
manufacturing or wholesale.
This statement is revealing, as it indicates how best
practices, hence ordinary capabilities, are widely
distributed, at least in the global automotive indus-
try.45 If so, they can no longer be the foundation of
competitive advantage, as elaborated below.
Ordinary capabilities: Replication and transfer.
What undermines the power of ordinary capabilities
to serve as the foundation of competitive advantage
for a particular MNE is that such capabilities can be
imitated much more easily today than in earlier
times. A good deal of know-how, which used to be
tacit and proprietary just two or three decades ago, is
now explicit and in the public domain – available
from consultants, schools of engineering, and the
public literature.46 Explicit (codiﬁed) knowledge tra-
vels easily, and the Internet, by allowing low-cost
access to information, has helped enable this. The
implication is that the barriers to the transfer of
ordinary capabilities have been dramatically reduced
in recent decades.
Indeed, many basic business services (e.g.,
accounting, sales, human resource management) can
today be readily outsourced to computing resources
resident in the “cloud”.47 These developments –
enabled by Internet protocols, the general march of
computer-processing power, and the growth of “fat
clients” – greatly facilitate starting up, as well as
running, a business. Many routine operational and
administrative capabilities can be supported remotely
by independent providers. Hence, they are no longer
as critical to competitive advantage. For example, the
implications of “cloud computing” for the MNE are
profound. In short, the Internet facilitates the avail-
ability of ordinary capabilities not just because of
low cost and easy access to the ﬂow of information,
as Richard Nelson has emphasized,48 but because of
low cost and easy access to the computing, software
resources, and data storage needed to support basic,
yet high-quality, business functions.
Knowledge transfer within an organization pre-
sents a host of difﬁculties (Szulanski, 1996). And
replicability does not always imply imitability.
Knowledge may remain difﬁcult for external organi-
zations to replicate to the extent that it is embedded
in interactions among people, tasks, and tools
(Argote & Ingram, 2000).
Notably, MNEs investing abroad “appear to adopt
good management practices in almost every country
in which they operate” (Bloom et al., 2012: 14).
Indeed, Bloom et al. found that foreign multina-
tionals are generally better managed than host-
country ﬁrms. MNEs may thus succeed for a while
with strong ordinary capabilities, because ordinary
capabilities developed at home may temporarily be
distinctive abroad.49
Some less-developed economies still lack domestic
ﬁrms performing what, from a developed-country
perspective, would be thought of as mundane
tasks. Yum! brand’s success in China, for example,
appears to be due in large part to its ability to trans-
fer and adapt ordinary capabilities (Starvish,
2011). This adaptation is itself partially a dynamic
capability.
Another “barrier” to imitation is the simple failure
of rivals to implement publicly available best prac-
tices (Knott, 2003). Bloom et al. (2012: 13) found in
their study that there is a wide dispersion with
respect to good management practices within every
country and across countries, as shown in Figure 1.
In a survey of more than 10,000 organizations across
20 countries, they also found that foreign MNEs
were generally better managed (i.e., they had better
ordinary capabilities) than domestic ﬁrms (Bloom
et al., 2012: 23). Brazil and India had a large tail of
very badly managed ﬁrms.
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Nevertheless, competition and imitation will, over
time, lead to the erosion of any advantage from
ordinary capabilities. This may occur slowly, but
can be rapid in contexts where the absorptive
capacity of external organizations is high. An
MNE subsidiary relying solely on strong ordinary
capabilities in a particular host country will ﬁnd, if
the ordinary capabilities are imitable (e.g., via
knowledge spillovers through employee turnover)
and competitors can enter, that its advantage will
steadily diminish. In short, ordinary capabilities
will not support long-run competitive advantage
unless competition is suppressed by governmen-
tally or privately imposed entry barriers, or by weak
physical and social infrastructure that prevents
ordinary capabilities from quickly diffusing
throughout the economy.
DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES: ASSESSMENT
Since the late 1970s, local differentiation, global
integration, and innovation have characterized suc-
cessful ﬁrms operating globally. In the global econ-
omy today, the competitive advantage of the
business ﬁrm appears to rest on the development
and deployment of intangible assets,50 relationships,
and human capital. These developments have
placed a premium on the ability of companies to
become entrepreneurial and agile at home and
abroad, requiring in turn that management operate
with less authority, and organize to allow and pro-
mote ﬂexibility, responsiveness, and learning. This
requires dynamic capabilities.
As already noted, dynamic capabilities are under-
girded by processes (routines) and resources (posi-
tions). Dynamic capabilities rely not just on best
practices but on “signature” practices; not just on
any resources but on VRIN resources. They also
require astute managerial orchestration guided by
what Rumelt (2011) has called “good strategy”. Table
2 illustrates this, and contrasts it with ordinary
capabilities.
Signature processes and signature business models
are beyond industry best practices. Such processes
embody a company’s history, experience, culture,
and creativity (Gratton &Ghoshal, 2005). Because of
their deep roots, they are not so easily replicated by
others who do not share this history, and may have
different values, too. Over longer periods of time,
such processes and business models may become
somewhat imitable by others. As Gratton and
Ghoshal point out, such a transformation occurred
with Toyota’s leanmanufacturingmodel, the Toyota
System of Production.
Whether signature processes and business models
are “good”may take some time to become apparent.
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Figure 1 Best-practice diffusion.
Source: Bloom et al. (2012).
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indicators. However, the replicability of a process or
business model is often confounded, particularly
externally, by what Lippman and Rumelt (1982) call
“uncertain imitability”. This, along with a high tacit
component to the underlying knowledge, may keep
a signature process effectively proprietary.
There is an obvious opportunity for all business
enterprises to learn, and to embed that learning in
new signature processes and business models.
Hence the MNE competing in diverse contexts has
the opportunity to develop distinct signature pro-
cesses and models in different geographies. Accord-
ingly, the MNE as such may have an advantage in
the development of new products and signature
processes and models, as it can more readily run
multiple, simultaneous experiments than can a
pure domestic enterprise. Moreover, adaptation
and adoption of new processes inside the MNE are
likely to be easier than they would be across unafﬁ-
liated enterprises. Certainly, top management
can endeavor to drive such adoption inside the
company.
A corollary of the fact that VRIN resources and
signature processes and business models are pro-
ducts of the ﬁrm’s heritage and past managerial
decisions is that dynamic capabilities tend to get
built, are difﬁcult to imitate, and cannot generally be
bought. For example, Tim Cook, a long-time execu-
tive at Apple and its current CEO, said in February
2013: “Apple has the ability to innovate in all three
of these spheres and create magic… This isn’t some-
thing you can just write a check for. This is some-
thing you build over decades” (AFP, 2013). This is
the reason for the “stickiness” of dynamic capabil-
ities – that is, they don’t tend to travel well, they are
complex, and they are hard to ﬁgure out and to
implement.
Once again, Bob Lutz (2011) of General Motors put
it most succinctly:
Where the real work of making a car company successful
suddenly turns complex, and where the winners are sepa-
rated from the losers, is in the long-cycle product develop-
ment process, where short-term day-to-day metrics and the
tabulation of results are meaningless.
Dynamic capabilities also help characterize how
an enterprise obtains strengths, extends these
strengths (for instance by developing new business
models), synchronizes business processes and mod-
els with the business environment, and/or shapes the
business environment in its favor (Teece et al.,
1997). They are higher-order, difﬁcult-to-replicate
capabilities. Asset orchestration is implicated, and
dynamic capabilities support the ﬁrm beyond
merely achieving superior “coordination”. They are
based on processes that are beyond best practice, and
on resources that meet the VRIN criteria.
Firms with strong dynamic capabilities exhibit
technological and market agility. To achieve this,
they use less hierarchy. Agility, coupled with the
ability to sense new opportunities and threats, sup-
ports evolutionary ﬁtness.51 This inevitably requires
that ﬁrms constantly create new technologies, differ-
entiated and superior processes, and better business
models to stay ahead of the competition, stay in
tune with the market, and even shape the market if
necessary.52 The ﬁrmmust be able to simultaneously
cope with changes in the external environment
and with changes caused by processes internal to
the ﬁrm (Greiner, 1998).53 It will be aided if it has
sufﬁcient resources and superior information, talent,
and capital, including relationship capital. However,
absent the required ability to orchestrate resources,
and to create and execute a quality strategy, such
resources are likely to be of little value.
As noted, strong dynamic capabilities will help
organizations to stay relevant to marketplace needs
and technological opportunities. Organizations
must change their capabilities to reﬂect anticipated
changes in markets, technologies, and the business
environment more generally. However, as Winter
explains, change can be reactive – ﬁrms can easily
get into a “ﬁre ﬁghting” mode, which he describes
as “high paced, contingent, opportunistic and per-
haps creative search for satisfactory alternative
behaviors”. Winter (2003: 993) called this “ad hoc
problem-solving”. This is in contrast to routine-
directed problem-solving. In Winter’s terminology,
the latter is a capability. He correctly recognized
Table 2 Elements of the capabilities framework
Core building blocks Weak ordinary capabilities Strong ordinary capabilities Strong dynamic capabilities
Processes (routines) Sub-par practices Best practices Signature practices and business models
Positions (resources) Few ordinary resources Munificent ordinary resources VRIN resources
Paths (strategy) Doing things poorly Doing things right Doing the right things (good strategy)
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that it is possible that on close examination even
“ﬁre ﬁghting” approaches to problem-solving may
have micro-routines embedded within. Certainly,
skills are implicated.
The individual and organizational skills at issue
with dynamic capabilities are much more oriented
to creating unique problem-solving methodologies
and signature processes. Problem-solving is very
much a dynamic capability.54 There is much dis-
tance between the purely routinized and that which
is purely ad hoc. The middle ground also constitutes
a (dynamic) capability. Indeed, most invention isn’t
fully directed. The innovation process is neither
completely routinized nor ad hoc.
The capabilities approach, expanded upon below,
sees MNE activity as driven by the opportunity to
leverage capabilities and create and capture value
from innovation on a global scale. Entrepreneurial
managers are not just resource allocators; they also
sense, shape, and exploit opportunities. A theory of
the (multinational) ﬁrm that doesn’t recognize this
logic and these phenomena, and their associated
locational dimensions, will be unable to explain the
MNE's sustainable competitive advantage.55
To create and exploit opportunities globally, entre-
preneurial activity must be linked up with capital
and other complementary assets, because property
rights over discoveries and inventions are incom-
plete. Some ownership and control over comple-
mentary assets is likely to be needed to assist the
MNE in the appropriation of value needed to sup-
port continued investment (Teece, 1986b, 2006b).
As explained in Teece (1980, 1982, 1986b), man-
agers, entrepreneurs, and innovators cannot just
leave it up to the market to line up speciﬁc assets
and develop new ones, and integrate them into a
well-functioning global invention, production, and
marketing system that provides the theoretical rai-
son d’être and management for the MNE. They are
themselves the instruments that make markets work
well. Even if Coasian transaction costs were zero,
learning, co-creation, and orchestration functions
would still need to be carried out. The entrepreneu-
rially managed MNE is a vehicle designed to do so.
The ﬁrm is indeed, as Coase (1937: 388) noted, an
island of conscious power – but it is unsatisfactory to
frame managerial capacity primarily in transaction
cost-minimizing terms, as Coase asserted. Rather,
the functions of management can be framed in
terms of assisting in the building and/or securing
and deploying of VRIN resources and signature
processes not typically available for sale (or, if avail-
able, not routinely priced in a liquid market). The
business ﬁrm is an island of (non-market) resource
allocation orchestrated to enhance learning, value
creation, know-how transfer, and value capture.
These factors help explain why it is necessary to
transform internalization theory into an entrepre-
neurial/capabilities theory of the MNE. The eco-





















Figure 2 Logical structure of the dynamic capabilities paradigm.
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CAPABILITIES AND MNE PERFORMANCE
While ordinary capabilities are insufﬁcient for long-
term survival and growth, dynamic capabilities
enable the ﬁrm to have a better chance of establish-
ing and maintaining competitive advantage (and
concomitant superior performance) in economies
where change is rapid, and intangible assets are
critical to competitive differentiation.56 However, as
indicated in Figure 2, the ﬁrm also needs good
strategy.
Dynamic capabilities are hard to develop, and
difﬁcult to transfer across borders, in part because
they are tacit, in part because they are often
embedded in a unique set of relationships and
histories, and in part because of uncertain imitabil-
ity. In short, dynamic capabilities undergird the
“future” of any MNE, because, along with strategy,
they undergird competitive advantage in fast-
moving, knowledge-based economies. They often
lie at the heart of both short- and long-cycle product
development processes.
Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002: 14) noted that “as
major global competitors achieve parity in the scale
of their operations and their international market
positions, the ability to link and leverage knowledge
is increasingly the factor that differentiates the
winners from the losers and survivors”. These
authors were tilting toward elements of a dynamic
capabilities framework, because such a framework is
also about linking and leveraging know-how. Good
strategy, strong ordinary capabilities, scale (in some
circumstances), and strong dynamic capabilities are
all needed for long-term growth and survival in the
framework advanced here.
As noted, ordinary capabilities are about doing
things right, whereas dynamic capabilities are about
doing the right things, at the right time, based on
unique processes, organizational culture, and a pres-
cient assessment of the business environment and
technological opportunities.57 By the right things, I
refer to investment in new products, processes, and
business models that are in tune with the ﬁrm’s
business environments at home and abroad, and
with its strategy. The late Steve Jobs made a strong
statement with respect to the importance of spend-
ing money on the right things:
Innovation has nothing to do with how many R&D dollars
you have. When Apple came up with the Mac, IBM was
spending at least one hundred times more on R&D. It’s …
about…how much you get it. (cited in Kirkpatrick, 1998)
“Getting it” requires strong dynamic capabilities.
The dynamic capabilities perspective goes beyond
organizational “ﬁt”,58 and also beyond a ﬁnancial-
statement view of enterprise strength, to emphasize
recognition of the most promising opportunities
and the managerial orchestration needed to create,
accommodate, and fashion resources both inside
and outside the ﬁrm, at home and abroad. Included
are the external linkages and alliances that are
common in the global economy, and well documen-
ted and analyzed in the international business
literature.
At a quite general level, dynamic capabilities are
about how an enterprise seizes the future and devel-
ops the products, processes, and business models to
meet (and shape) ever-changing markets. Dynamic
capabilities result from superior top management
orchestration skills. They are hard to teach, in part
because there is a large tacit component (Teece et al.,
1997).
The greater the diversity and rate of change in
business environments, and the greater the impor-
tance of intangible (including relationship) assets,
the more critical good strategy and strong dynamic
capabilities become for the MNE’s growth and ﬁnan-
cial performance. To maintain competitiveness, the
MNE must develop and maintain asset alignment
both internally and with collaborating ﬁrms. The
MNE and its partner ﬁrms must develop and deliver
joint “solutions” that are in tune with customer
needs in multiple environments. It is not just a
matter of selecting the right organizational bound-
aries to achieve ﬁt, although that is clearly one
element.59 Strong dynamic capabilities include the
processes, business models, and leadership skills
needed to effectuate high-performance sensing, seiz-
ing, and transforming. Strong dynamic capabilities
help ensure evolutionary ﬁtness; ordinary capabil-
ities are more attuned to the requirements for tech-
nical ﬁtness.60
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH JUXTAPOSED
AGAINST TRADITIONAL MNE THEORY
Prior sections of this paper have treated the ﬁrm in a
general way, consistent with the need to encompass
multinationality. This section explores particular
issues squarely within the established domain of
international business studies. It is, after all, the
potential for synergistic interaction between head-
quarters and foreign locations (Cantwell, 2009),
with their distinct institutional contexts and cap-
abilities proﬁles, that distinguishes the MNE case
from the general theory of the ﬁrm. Efforts are made
to explain how a capabilities approach leads to an
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all-encompassing perspective that can incorporate
both prongs of the internalization paradigm.
Leveraging Capabilities Through Horizontal
Expansion
The speciﬁcation of market-entry strategies is a key
attribute of various internalization/governance the-
ories of the MNE. One way to observe the different
insights from the two main approaches to internali-
zation is to examine how they impact perspectives
on MNE expansion.
The impact of the transaction-cost-based interna-
lization approach is already evident in the literature
on the MNE (e.g., Hennart, 2009; Zahra et al., 2000).
However, this stream of work tells us very little about
which markets the MNE should create and enter;
implicitly, one can perhaps read into internalization
that the right markets are those in which the services
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets generate value. In other words,
transaction-cost-based internalization theories help
specify entry mode, but not the best direction and
timing for expansion. These are important decisions,
and a robust theory of the MNE should be able to
help explain them.
Clearly horizontal market-entry strategies of the
MNE are not just about ﬁguring out the right con-
tractual mode. Firm-speciﬁc capabilities will need to
be assessed, both as to relevance abroad and as to
transfer costs. Modiﬁcations and adaptations may
sometimes be required. Intellectual property issues
will need to be analyzed. Replication of capabilities in
a different context may be difﬁcult (Teece, 1976,
1977a). In the main, the problems likely to be
encountered are not contractual ones; they relate
more to technology (and capability) transfer costs,
and the assessment of market opportunity.
In effectuating such transfers, it is important for
the MNE to minimize the “liability of foreignness”
(Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995) while simultaneously
exploiting home-country beneﬁts. As Helfat and
Lieberman note:
Established ﬁrms enter markets where they have pre-entry
resources and capabilities that are similar to the resource
requirements of the market of entry. The choice of geo-
graphic markets is most strongly inﬂuenced by specialized
resources and capabilities, including knowledge of the local
market and tacit technological skills. (Helfat & Lieberman,
2002: 738)61
Thus ﬁrm-level capabilities act simultaneously
both as a constraint on and as an enabler of what
ﬁrms can do with respect to foreign market entry.
International expansion will be facilitated when the
ﬁrm capabilities align withmarket needs abroad, and
management in the parent or subsidiary can keep it
that way. The unevenness in the global business and
economic landscape navigated by MNEs creates
opportunities to both transfer and deploy existing
capabilities, and create new ones, thereby fueling
cross-border expansion.62
Hence, while the boundaries of the MNE may be
partially determined by transaction costs, in larger
measure they are likely to be determined by capabil-
ities and the need for, and difﬁculty associated with,
replication and the associated transfer of technolo-
gies and capabilities. This aspect of the argument
echoes the theory of technological accumulation
outlined by Cantwell (1989, 1995, 1999). It also
implies that MNEs will invest abroad to augment
their existing capabilities, as their geographically
dispersed networks facilitate the accumulation of
technological assets over time.
Accordingly, the boundaries of the MNE can be
seen as resulting from entrepreneurial management
developing and assembling the particular constella-
tion of speciﬁc assets that the ﬁrm’s activities require
in each location where it elects to operate. The MNE
becomes the locus for creating and leveraging pro-
ducts and capabilities, and for capturing value from
this process globally.63 In the language of economic
theory, value is achieved not just by minimizing
transaction costs but also by exploiting (through
management actions) the implicit bid–ask spreads
associated with the “transfer” of intangible assets.
The MNE’s country of origin is a key contextual
factor. Regional and national systems of innovation,
for instance, shape ﬁrm experiences, knowledge, and
capabilities. Moreover, good management is not uni-
formly distributed either. Entrepreneurial manage-
ment is a scarce resource that is itself geographically
concentrated. Hence, as Madhok and Osegowitsch
(2000: 326) note: “Home country characteristics have
a strong bearing on the evolution of the domestic
industry and the international competitiveness of
individual ﬁrms”. Firms are in part products of the
environments in which they were born; by going
global, they can tap into regional and national sys-
tems of innovation outside the home country. The
capabilities of the MNE stem in part from the diverse
environments in which they operate and compete.
However, most country advantages may be open
to all that choose to invest in a particular host
country. Low-cost labor, for example, is generally
fungible across all foreign entrants. Hence, as dis-
cussed below, country-speciﬁc advantages are not so
compelling in the (dynamic) capabilities-based
A capabilities-based theory of the MNE David J Teece
24
Journal of International Business Studies
approach to competitive advantage. They may help
explain entry, but they are at best one factor behind
competitive advantage at the enterprise or business
level. In short, the essence of the MNE is that “it
accepts, adapts to, and capitalizes on institutional,
cultural, and market heterogeneity while simulta-
neously trying to capture economies associated with
some kind of (scalable) advantage in certain assets or
processes it owns or is currently developing” (Teece,
2006a: 125).
How and When Do MNEs Enter New Geographic
Markets?
The mode of entry into a foreign market is the topic
on which internalization theories have been
thought to have their ﬁrmest footing. However, as
discussed above, one cannot fully understand
choices with respect to global expansion mode by
looking at transaction cost/governance issues
alone. At least two other factors are at work. First,
the presence of pre-entry capabilities, including
slack resources, matters considerably. An MNE will
(and should) be reluctant to enter a foreign market
(or even a proximate domestic market) if it doesn’t
have (or cannot readily access) at least strong
ordinary capabilities and enough slack to replicate
them without hitting internal resource con-
straints. The slack resources at issue might even be
ﬁnancial. Indeed, in Teece (1986b: 296), cash was
highlighted as an important factor in explaining
the mode of market entry. As Madhok (1997)
notes, the ﬁrm boundary issues are largely capabil-
ity-related. When a ﬁrm has strong ordinary and
dynamic capabilities, the incremental costs of FDI
are likely to be low.
Conversely, when timing is of the essence and
certain capabilities are absent, joint ventures are likely
to be preferred by the enterprise endeavoring to go
global. When an MNE enters a foreign market, it will
need to replicate some of the capabilities (processes,
skills, etc.) employed in the home market. Adjust-
ments may be necessary because the skills and know-
how the MNE possesses in one context might not
quite work in a different geographic context. Getting
this ﬁt right requires dynamic capabilities.
Time–cost tradeoffs have been analyzed and
empirically estimated for technology transfer pro-
cesses (Teece, 1977b, 1980, 1986b). If the time–cost
tradeoff is too steep, managers should associate
with (joint) venture partners who can help ﬂatten
them.64 Joint ventures and collaboration not only
reduce ﬁnancial outlays; they often also enhance the
MNE’s ability to access local capabilities. Thus mode
of entry will depend not just on contractual factors
but also on who owns and controls the required
capabilities, the time it takes to transfer them, and
the timing imperatives of market entry.
Scholars have begun to study why and how some
ﬁrms internationalize very early in life (e.g., Rennie,
1993; Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). The “born global”
phenomenon is consistent with dynamic capabil-
ities. Small companies can have strong dynamic
capabilities, and may be able to access abroad the
ordinary capabilities necessary to make their foreign
market-entry strategies viable. Small entrepreneurial
ﬁrms can quickly create and (with local partners) co-
create new markets abroad.
Recent evidence (Arregle, Miller, Hitt, & Beamish,
2013) indicates that prior investment in a region
made up of multiple countries impacts future deci-
sions to invest in these countries: that is, capabilities
can be redeployed within regions more readily than
between them. This ﬁnding, which goes beyond
previous country-level analyses, is consistent with
capability transfer being easier with geographic
proximity, and with institutional and language simi-
larity. The ﬁnding is more consistent with capabil-
ities theories than with transaction cost/contract
theories, although the two approaches reinforce
each other, because contracting is also easier when
institutions are more alike.
Dynamic capabilities themselves (involving as
they do sensing, seizing, and, ultimately, transform-
ing) can in most cases be sequenced over time and
across different geographic markets. It is more chal-
lenging if the ﬁrm has to perform all three simulta-
neously in each of its businesses, and in all of its
markets. However, such simultaneity is sometimes
required.65 For example, Yum! Brands (the owner of
fast-food brands KFC, Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut) has
simultaneously engaged in rapid expansion in
China, and in retrenchment and transformation in
one of its established markets, the United Kingdom.
The Role of Headquarters and the Subsidiary in
Dynamic Capabilities Theory
The governance (transaction cost) theory of interna-
lization has little to say about the role of headquarters
and foreign subsidiaries.66 Capabilities perspectives,
on the other hand, provide insights into the respec-
tive roles of headquarters and subsidiaries.
The headquarters function is where certain cap-
abilities reside. The M-form (multidivisional form)
of organization facilitates decomposition of the
MNE’s architecture by allowing considerable auton-
omy to regional/country and divisional managers.
A capabilities-based theory of the MNE David J Teece
25
Journal of International Business Studies
Headquarters can enhance the ﬁrm’s capabilities by
allowing and facilitating technology transfers among
the divisions, and by encouraging and supporting the
exploitation of complementarities.67
Top management at headquarters performs a most
important global asset orchestration function in the
dynamic capabilities framework. They allocate the
ﬁnancial resources needed for the MNE to create
markets outside the home jurisdiction while leaving
operational matters to lower levels of the organiza-
tion. As Peter Buckley (2009) notes in his (recent)
work on the “global factory”, the management style
that network conﬁgurations require is vastly differ-
ent from conventional “command and control”
methods. Indeed, he refers to headquarters as “a
‘controlling intelligence’ or orchestrator of activ-
ities” (233). In essence, Buckley is advancing a
dynamic capabilities perspective on the MNE.
Subsidiaries nevertheless play a vital role in the
ﬁrm’s dynamic capabilities. They can generate know-
how and capabilities from their own histories that
can be transferred to other business units at home or
abroad. This tends to be neglected and/or overlooked
in transaction cost approaches. It’s a signiﬁcant and
vibrant component of the literature on international
management (e.g., Birkinshaw, 2000).
In fact, it has been recognized (Bartlett & Ghoshal,
1989) that the MNE need not be especially hier-
archical; it may well need to behave more like a
network. Subsidiaries can have considerable auton-
omy, simultaneously being integrated in a world-
wide operation. New products and processes can be
developed by the parent or a subsidiary then shared
globally. This decentralized M-form MNE allows
and encourages local knowledge creation and local
discovery of opportunities, with subsequent orches-
tration activities applied by top management. Trans-
action cost approaches provide few insights into this
distribution of activity. However, it is consistent
with work by Rugman and Bennett (1982) on world
product mandates, and with later research by
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) on how local initiatives
by foreign subsidiaries help generate and leverage
local capabilities onto the global stage, and
strengthen the MNE’s competitive advantage.
It is important to recognize that once an MNE
creates a subsidiary that establishes its own networks
and learning path, the subsidiary can accumulate
speciﬁc assets and capabilities that can ﬁnd useful
application elsewhere. As a sizable literature has docu-
mented, subsidiaries can engage in “reverse” technol-
ogy transfer to the parent that may well generate
opportunities (e.g., Birkinshaw, 1997; Birkinshaw &
Pedersen, 2008; Phene & Almeida, 2008; Prahalad &
Doz, 1981). Rugman and Verbeke (1992, 2001, 2003)
also recognized quite properly that ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets
could arise anywhere in the MNE. This is consistent
with a capabilities perspective.
In short, capabilities perspectives elevate the
MNE’s subsidiaries in that they can be seen to con-
tribute to the competitive advantage of the MNE, as
recognized by many, including Birkinshaw, Hood,
and Young (2005). Learning and the development of
signature processes and VRIN resources are seen to
be subsidiary-speciﬁc. This distribution of activity
provides the opportunity to recognize what Bartlett
and Ghoshal (1989) called “the transnational solu-
tion”, combining astute (country-speciﬁc) blends of
adaptation, rationalization, and centralization.
Global Distribution of R&D and Innovative
Ecosystems
An entrepreneurial/managerial theory of the ﬁrm
must also be able to explain asset augmentation
(i.e., the creation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets), asset exploi-
tation, extension, and renewal. In the dynamic
capabilities framework, asset augmentation comes
fundamentally from R&D and learning processes
(e.g., learning by doing; learning by using), whether
internal or from (and with) partners, and from apply-
ing the logic of the “proﬁting from technological
innovation” paradigm (Teece 1986b, 2006b). It also
requires recognizing that innovation necessitates col-
laboration with a panoply of partners in an ecosys-
tem. Ongoing engagement with ecosystem partners
can be seen as leading to the migration of the locus of
value creation from the ﬁrm to the level of the
business ecosystem. External sourcing and collab-
oration can, when done well, augment the ﬁrm’s
internal capabilities (Capron & Mitchell, 2009;
Chesbrough, 2003). However, it can also drain them
if partners are laggards, and fail to contribute as
agreed.
The transaction cost-based internalization theory
by no means ignored the role of R&D. Indeed, it
is of central importance in Buckley and Casson
(1976). However, the development of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
technological assets through internal and external
combinations – and hence through dynamic cap-
abilities – has not been emphasized much in the
transaction cost approach.68 The capability to inno-
vate not only depends on the amount spent on
R&D; it also depends critically on how that is spent,
both as to whether it is done in house or outsourced,
and on how well it is managed. Once again, good
management requires excellence with respect to the
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orchestration function described earlier. Here the
orchestration is of technology both inside and exter-
nal to the ﬁrm, both at home and abroad, and across
different technological domains.
Early studies of R&D in the foreign subsidiaries of
US-based MNEs showed that, in the 1970s, compa-
nies used R&D not just to access offshore talent, but
(and mainly) to adapt technologies and products for
local markets (Mansﬁeld, Romeo, & Teece, 1979).
This is still the case, but the degree to which US
enterprises use subsidiaries to develop new products
has undoubtedly increased. Indeed, Cantwell and
Kosmopoulou (2002) see R&D migrating to sites
where local conditions are most conducive to tech-
nology creation. Location decisions have much to
do with market access and tapping into talent, and
less to do with transaction cost issues.
The “foreign” subsidiary can also play a role not
only in technology creation, but also in capturing
value from innovation generated in any part of the
MNE. The foreign subsidiary can invest in co-specia-
lizedmanufacturing assets, co-specialized distribution/
marketing assets, and/or co-specialized technologies.
Ownership of such assets can play an important role
in the MNE’s ability to proﬁt from innovation. This is
a quite general result from the innovation literature
(Teece 1986b, 2006b), but it seems especially applic-
able to the MNE. These issues have been expanded at
length by Cantwell and Mudambi (2005). For the
purpose of this paper, themain point is that the global
distribution of R&D can be seen as a phenomenon
that supports the creation of capabilities in different
geographies: capabilities that perhaps then need to be
integrated to produce new products, as in the case of
the civilian aircraft industry. Governance (transaction
cost) theory produces only limited insight into this
phenomenon. Insights from the strategy and capabil-
ities perspectives seem more pertinent.
Location and “Country” Factors and MNE Theory
Rugman has built a theory of the MNE that postu-
lates the need to recognize that MNE location
decisions are impacted by country-speciﬁc and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. In the Rugman matrices, for
example, labor-intensive manufacturing operations
of MNEs will be drawn to low-wage environments.
The dynamic capabilities framework suggests,
however, that, while country and regional factors
may impact investment location decisions, they
usually have little relevance to understanding how
MNE competitive advantage is anchored. The simple
reason is that country factors are often exploitable to
a substantial degree both by domestic ﬁrms and by
multiple MNEs. Unless a particular MNE has a
privileged relationship with a nation-state, or a
unique and difﬁcult-to-replicate history there, coun-
try advantages are accessible by all MNE investors.
Hence country factors may explain why economic
activity of relevance to an MNE is in a particular
offshore location. Internalization theory will help
determine whether that activity is best accessed via
outsourcing or by FDI. However, country (and regio-
nal) factors available to incumbents and new entrants
alike will have little to do with explaining ﬁrm-level
competitive advantage, except inasmuch as they help
explain the history of particular units of the MNE.
This is a place where traditional MNE theory and the
theory of competitive advantage part ways.
In short, country and regional factors can be
foundational for MNE competitive advantage only
when a particular MNE is able to access local advan-
tages and avoid local disabilities in a way that others
cannot (or fail to) copy. For example, learning or
other knowledge development that takes place in
distinct host-country environments might form the
basis for signature processes and VRIN resources that
could contribute to competitive advantage for the
company as a whole, and these would still be
difﬁcult for rivals to replicate.
In the framework advanced here, MNE competi-
tive advantage ﬂows from MNE-speciﬁc factors.
These include not only the ﬁrm’s innovation, corpo-
rate culture, and management, but also the location-
speciﬁc history and resources related to the ﬁrm’s
unique global footprint. This is where national
systems of innovation (Nelson, 1993) are relevant,
and this is all the more important because sources of
innovation are more globally dispersed than ever
before. If a host-country national system (and the
MNE’s history) affords privileged access to the
national system, or to the outcome of the innova-




The ﬁeld of international business has been consid-
erably animated by the tools and perspective of
transaction cost economics. It has provided useful
insights into enterprise structure and scope, into alli-
ance arrangements, and into governance more gener-
ally. It outlines best practice with respect to contract
design (an ordinary, not a dynamic, capability).
Contractual issues are of interest to policymakers
and managers alike. However, there are a multi-
plicity of issues – such as global product mandates
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and understanding individual ﬁrm performance –
where the transaction cost approach has provided
parsimonious insight at best. International man-
agement scholars have, as a consequence, some-
times developed communities of their own within
management academies rather than the interna-
tional business academies. As a result, their work
has not been well integrated into the international
business literature. Moreover, it often lacks a good
theoretical grounding. Ad hoc theorizing is com-
mon. International management desperately needs
a theory to help amalgamate its many disparate
threads.
Scholars wedded to governance-based or exchange-
based approaches may wish to explain proﬁts and the
competitive advantage of particular ﬁrms by appeal-
ing to the raison d’être of ﬁrms in general. This is not
possible. A general theory of the MNE that does not
recognize ﬁrm-level heterogeneity is of little utility to
scholars and practitioners interested in diagnosing
the prospects and plights of particular ﬁrms.
The MNE manager’s job in neoclassical theory and
in early internalization/governance approaches is
quite minimal. It is merely to:
(1) set output levels in each market such that mar-
ginal revenue equals marginal cost, and select
inputs by rotating a price line around a transfor-
mation curve; and
(2) determine ﬁrm boundaries by outsourcing until
the marginal cost of performing activities intern-
ally is equal to the cost of outsourcing, and align
contractual structures according to the transac-
tion speciﬁcity of assets.69
There is little recognition in internalization/gov-
ernance approaches of the importance of discovery,
learning, adjustment, and other forms of capability
building. Unspeciﬁed mechanisms also somehow
create ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets somewhere.
In a robust theory of the MNE, the manager’s
role needs to be broader. The dynamic capabilities
framework achieves this by imbuing management
with both entrepreneurial and leadership functions.
Bartlett and Ghoshal deﬁne what they call “trans-
national corporations” that have traits not unlike
successful ﬁrms that are dynamically competitive.
Their transnational enterprises build assets and cap-
abilities that are dispersed and interdependent; over-
seas operations provide local differentiation but are
nevertheless integrated into worldwide operations.
These enterprises manage innovation through
co-development and global sharing (Bartlett &
Ghoshal, 2002: 75).
The “transnational” approach, like much of the
rest of the literature in international management
(e.g., Doz & Kosonen, 2008, 2010; Wilson & Doz,
2011), appears to apply an implicit theory of the
MNE that is animated more by ﬁrm-speciﬁc capabil-
ities, learning, and networks than by transaction
cost or governance considerations. Asset orchestra-
tion and entrepreneurial cross-border market crea-
tion and co-creation are at the core. What’s missing
is the careful identiﬁcation of foundations and
assumptions. This paper has endeavored to show
how the implicit tenets in international manage-
ment theory can ﬁt comfortably within a broader
capabilities/entrepreneurship-based theory of the
MNE that explains not only its nature, as per Ronald
Coase, but also its competitive advantage and asso-
ciated ﬁnancial performance over time. The
(dynamic) capabilities framework advanced here
allows international business and international
management research to coexist in harmony.
In contrast to contractual approaches, the cap-
abilities approach has an important role for the
entrepreneurial manager, not just in asset orches-
tration but also in creating new products and
services. It endeavors to explain heterogeneity and
the determinants of ﬁrm-level proﬁtability, not just
the existence of ﬁrms. Access to distinct resources,
the development of signature processes, engage-
ment in co-creation activity, and implementation
of good strategy each play a role. These concepts
have, to date, had at best an awkward and quite
limited home in contractual/governance-based
theories.
CONCLUSION
The thrust of this paper is that transaction-cost-
based or comparative-governance-based theories of
the MNE are too narrow to capture a good deal of
what is critical to the MNE and its ﬁnancial perfor-
mance. (The OLI model, which has evolved to
embrace capabilities alongside internalization, goes
some way toward ﬁlling the gap.) Yet governance-
oriented theories of the MNE still do not ask enough
of the right questions, and they “read out” of the
theory of the MNE cross-ﬁrm heterogeneity and any
signiﬁcant role for entrepreneurs, managers, and
leaders. Notwithstanding, there is still utility to the
paradigm.
What makes MNEs distinctive is the fact that they
each have separate histories, and they each span
jurisdictions and territories where markets, factors of
production, ﬁrms and technologies, and national
and regional infrastructure are likely to be different.
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Where certain capabilities and markets are absent,
they need to be created. In these environments,
entrepreneurs and managers in parents and subsidi-
aries build signature processes, deploy distinct
resources, and design good business models and
strategies in pursuit of proﬁts. The basic question to
be answered by a robust theory of the MNE is not
simply where to locate in order to minimize produc-
tion and transaction costs, but where to locate to
build or deploy signature processes and obtainmarket
access while guarding intellectual property and lever-
aging the ﬁrm’s existing VRIN resources into new
business/market environments.
What makes the MNE conceptually “interesting”,
and a challenge to model and manage, is that it
operates/sells inmultiple environments. Its activities
must be consonant with those various environ-
ments, and, importantly, these environments often
need to be shaped, andmarkets need to be “created”.
Accordingly, an MNE’s dynamic capabilities must be
more ampliﬁed and leveraged than those of a ﬁrm
with a less ambitious, purely domestic, focus.
Importantly, the transaction cost/market failures
paradigm that has hitherto anchored internalization
(and much international business research) often
deﬂects attention from critical managerial issues,
and creates artiﬁcial tensions with research in inter-
national management. In the MNE theory advanced
here, management’s task is not just to overcome
contractual difﬁculties; it must also build and lever-
age distinctive resources, signature processes, and
signature business models, and combine assets
internally and externally, guided by a prescient
strategy. The MNE’s growth and survival is not just
about adapting to market failures; it’s also about
creating and deploying VRIN resources and signa-
ture processes and distinct business models to enable
excellence in meeting (or possibly even modifying)
market demand in ways that are hard for competi-
tors to imitate. This, in turn, may lead the MNE to
engage in technology and capability transfer, and
possibly even the strengthening of complementors
and suppliers.70 Put differently, the building and
leveraging (extending) of dynamic capabilities can
animate FDI decisions. In contrast, what seems to
animate the ﬁrm in the transaction cost/market
failure paradigm is mitigating contractual hazards.
Clearly this is not sufﬁcient to explain MNE activity,
much less MNE heterogeneity.
Over the past 30 years, the international business
literature has had a strong contractual/transaction
cost ﬂavor that has served it well. All along, there
have been various strands that have toyed with
capability ideas, but the international business lit-
erature has embraced issues of entrepreneurship and
capabilities in only a limited fashion. Certainly
there has been a gradual migration under way by
some leading scholars of the contractual/exchange
approach toward an implicit or explicit capabilities
approach. However, when one slides from one para-
digm to another in a subtle, undeclared way without
announcement of old assumptions abandoned and
new ones embraced, the literature runs the risk of
becoming confused. Hence there is a need to be clear
around the shifts that are going on, or progress will
stall. Two of the goals of this paper have been to
declare the tension, and to try to resolve it.
The multidisciplinary framework presented here
advances capabilities concepts without ignoring
governance/contractual issues. As international
business scholars begin to more fully embrace the
entrepreneurship/capabilities approach, a more uni-
ﬁed theory of the MNE can emerge that will support
a revamped internalization school, allowing a more
productive dialogue among management scholars
and practitioners. A more active interchange of
research with strategy and management scholars –
as well as with researchers in (evolutionary) econom-
ics, organizations, and entrepreneurship – should
follow. A richer internalization theory of the MNE
will also allow management scholars as well as
economists to talk meaningfully about the sources
and persistence (or lack thereof) of ﬁrm-level compe-
titive advantage and associated superior ﬁnancial
performance. With these developments, there is a
good chance that the ﬁeld of international business
will escape its current confusion, and lead the way in
advancing a parsimonious, tractable, and plausible
theory of the ﬁrm and competitive advantage that
will inform research, teaching, policy, and prescrip-
tion across multiple ﬁelds of inquiry.
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NOTES
1As Ronald Coase (1991) pointed out, it is not
enough for a theory of the firm to merely explain firm
boundaries. In particular, an acceptable theory of the
firm needs to explain its “essence”. Such a theory has
yet to fully emerge, either in the domestic or in the
MNE context. One might also hope that the theory
could explain recent developments, such as greater
outsourcing, greater geographical dispersion of
R&D activity, and the increase in international new
ventures.
2This is obviously a more ambitious goal than most
economists ever set themselves. See Hart (2011) for
more discussion.
3Barreto (2010: 258) notes that “the dynamic
capabilities view has attracted substantial attention
from scholars publishing in top tier journals.”
4“Entrepreneurship was a persistent, but seldom
central, theme in these studies. In her early study of the
internationalization of American Radiator Company, Mira
Wilkins criticized the insufficiency of international busi-
ness theories based purely on comparative advan-
tage and strategic thinking, and highlighted the
importance of evolutionary choices and uncertainty in
entrepreneurial decision-making. She emphasized the
importance of understanding a series of specific path-
dependent entrepreneurial decisions in the firm’s
growth that shaped options and outcomes… Wilkins
also discussed the ‘alert American entrepreneurs’ who
‘sought opportunities beyond the national boundaries’
(Jones and Wadhwani, 2007: 6).
5As Paul Walker notes, “expanding the orthodox
view of the firm to include the new reality of the
knowledge economy should be an urgent issue on the
economic research agenda” (Walker, 2009: 29).
6Peter Buckley likewise notes that “transaction
costs are, of course, not the whole story (again) but
they are an indispensable part of the whole story”
(Buckley, 2009: 227).
7The goal here is not only to explain the nature of
firms and their scope as per Coase (1937); it is also to
explain profit as per Knight (1921), although Knight’s
interest in profits was primarily at the economy-wide
level, less so at the firm level.
8Williamson (1999) seems to agree that an unad-
dressed issue in this literature is the generation of
differential firm performance.
9Hymer confused competitive advantage and
monopoly power. Competitive advantage need not,
and usually does not, imply that the firm possesses any
policy-relevant market power.
10Oliver Williamson (1985) sometimes chooses to
call transaction cost economics the “governance”
approach, as the framework endeavors to explain how
transactions are organized or “governed”.
11Writing within this first prong, the Coasian para-
digm, Teece (1976: 104) also noted that “technology
transfer can be facilitated within the multinational firm
because of economies realized with respect to trans-
actions costs, and the superior incentive and control
devices that the firm possesses and has available for
use”.
12Governance structures are arrangements by which
a transaction can be managed (governed) to mitigate
potential market exchange problems. Governance
structures encompass: (1) incentive intensity; (2) form
of administrative control; and (3) contract law regime
(Williamson, 1991).
13None of the textbook models of the firm – whether
generic or MNE oriented – captures the changes to the
MNE that movement toward a (global) knowledge
economy seems to entail. As Oliver Hart has recognized,
“most formal models of the firm are extremely rudi-
mentary, capable only of portraying hypothetical firms
that bear little relation to the complex organizations we
see in the world” (Hart, 1989: 1757).
14Ownership advantages were not entirely firm-
specific in Dunning’s treatment. However, Rugman
(1981) interpreted O advantages primarily as firm-
specific advantages (FSAs) – that is, specific to
individual firms. I owe thanks to Cantwell for valuable
comments on this point.
15The literature is still unsettled with respect to
whether ownership advantages are endogenous or
exogenous (Cantwell & Narula, 2003). Scholars
have noted that changes in the value of both
exogenous and endogenous variables affect each
other. Dunning, for instance, explains that asset-
seeking FDI at time t may well affect L advantages
of the host country in time t + 1, and the choice of
L affects their future O advantages, which requires “a
reconfiguration of traditional OLI variables” (Dunning,
2001: 178).
16As learning takes place in multiple organizational
and geographic sites, and with different comple-
mentarities, different performance levels are achieved
by different businesses. Different learning processes
enable particular firms to stay on different paths and
achieve peaks on today’s rugged and very global
industrial landscape. Moreover, idiosyncratic path-
dependent learning follows management’s initiation of
action, the establishment of routines, and the
development of organizational memory. This produces
“rugged landscapes” (Levinthal, 1997: 934).
Furthermore, the industrial landscape quite simply isn’t
flat, either domestically or abroad. Heterogeneity is the
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norm, and is explained in part by the existence of path-
dependent learning.
17The distinction being made here is a specific
instance of the general difference between “formal”
and “appreciative” theorizing (Nelson &Winter, 1982).
The former is a precise approach based on abstract
models that attempt to reveal something meaningful
about the real world despite their simplifications.
Appreciative theorizing is qualitative, and takes
observations of the real world as its starting point.
18The task at hand for managers is bigger than
simplifying transactional difficulties by engaging in
direct investment in wholly owned subsidiaries. Early
path-breaking ideas, such as copiers or scanners, are
often met with skepticism and over-pessimistic guess-
timates of their market potential. In such cases, it is left
to the originators of these ideas to try to prove
themselves right. This has often required amassing the
co-specialized and complementary assets needed to set
up an organization and adopt the requisite structures
and strategies to create or co-create new markets
(Pitelis & Teece, 2010) and reveal new sources of
demand.
19I also noted in my very early work that “the
literature on the multinational enterprise, whether
emphasizing market power or efficiency, suffers from
a common deficiency: underemphasis on dynamics”
(Teece, 1986a: 36); and that “transaction cost
economics must be married to organizational decision
theory if the dynamics of channel selection are to be
better understood” (Teece, 1986a: 37). Market creation
and co-creation are of course dynamic processes. In the
above quote, organizational decision theory is a poorly
worded proxy for what I now call dynamic capabilities
theory, discussed below.
20A look at the cross-border activities of global firms is
in line with our arguments. Take, for example, a firm
such as Coca-Cola, and its cross-border activities in
China and India. These do not simply involve activities
that are tantamount to solving existing market failures.
Instead, they involve the transfer of capabilities and the
creation of markets by designing and setting up
bottling companies and distribution systems; by inven-
ting new refrigerating technology; and by influencing
user perceptions.
21There is little room for uncertainty or innovation in
the various Coasian models of the MNE, and exten-
sions have not succeeded in creating theories that
incorporate learning, capability enhancement, and
innovation in a meaningful way.
22Williamson recognizes Koopmans’ (1957) distinc-
tions between primary and secondary uncertainty – but
uncertainty implicates transaction cost economics only
through its impact on the contracting process. Like
Coase, Williamson does not recognize Knightian, or
fundamental, uncertainty.
23Buckley has recently recognized that “the links
between the (multinational) firm, entrepreneurship
and transaction costs are strong” (Buckley, 2009: 227).
However, his treatment of entrepreneurship is mainly
contractual.
24The econometric results in Monteverde and Teece
(1982) showed that vertical integration was driven not
just by asset specificity. “Systems effects” and firm-level
effects were empirically much larger. In particular, there
are a variety of contractual arrangements, some more
firm-like, some more market-like.
25There is considerable sentiment that transaction
cost approaches to vertical integration and MNE
expansion (through wholly owned subsidiaries) put
too much emphasis on “hold-up” and recontracting
hazards. For example, General Motors’ acquisition of
Fisher Body, which has been used as the canonical
example of hold-up, has been shown on closer
examination to reflect just the opposite (i.e., GM
management trusted the Fisher Brothers, which is the
reason they bought the company) (Chandler &
Salsbury, 1971; Goldberg, 2008).
26Dunning, with his OLI approach, made a step in
the right direction; but OLI is also mostly static, and fails
to recognize capability building or entrepreneurial and
learning considerations (Pitelis, 2007). Rugman and
Verbeke (1992, 2001) incorporate strategic manage-
ment thinking into the internalization theory using the
concepts of “location-bound” and “non-location-
bound”.
27Interestingly, Casson has written extensively and
with considerable insight on entrepreneurship, aiming
to integrate entrepreneurial decision-making into the
theory of the firm. Using a definition arising from
information cost economics, Casson (2005: 325) views
judgmental decision-making as the defining charac-
teristic of the entrepreneur, which requires the entre-
preneur to develop skills for optimizing information
selection and processing. Although Casson endeav-
ored to incorporate the entrepreneur into the theory
of the firm, his theory does not seem to fully capture
the entrepreneurial function of the MNE manager as
advanced here. A key reason is that organizational
knowledge and capabilities are distinct from the
summation of the individuals’ knowledge and skills,
and Casson’s approach seems to be focused more on
the latter. Also, they often remain tacit (Polanyi,
1958).
28In today’s global economy, there is considerable
standardization of products and certain manufacturing
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technologies, and markets are more open than they
used to be. However, homogenization of tasks and
technologies has not yet occurred, and is unlikely to
do so any time soon. Differences in consumer
preferences and purchasing power also remain, and
will likely continue to do so.
29“When it comes to the international expansion
of manufacturing production itself a pure theory of
exchange is on weaker ground… [Technology] may
accumulate within the firm not so much because of the
characteristics of the market for technology once
it has been created, as because of the conditions
under which it is most easily generated and used in
production” (Cantwell, 1989: 216).
30In Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, and in Teece
(1986b), competitive advantage flows from the
ownership of particular unique intangible assets (such
as firm-specific technology), and from the ownership of
certain complementary assets.
31As Machiavelli noted in The Prince 500 years ago:
“The prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it
changes… he whose actions do not accord with the
times will not be successful… if times and affairs
change, he is ruined if he does not change his course
of action”.
32Note that the “positioning” referenced here is not
market positioning, in the manner used by Porter
(1980). Market share is of little relevance to this
analysis, except when there are strong network effects.
The external business environment – writ large – is,
however, highly relevant. This is perhaps better
summarized by the concept of the ecosystem rather
than industry (Teece, 2012).
33The approach does not deny that firms are
necessary to delimit recontracting hazards and other
negative consequences of opportunism. Rather, the
theory goes beyond this to recognize the need to
organize so as to embrace opportunity, and to capture
gains from discovering and exploiting scope economies
derived from complementarities and co-specialization.
34An observation variously attributed to Charles de
Gaulle and Lou Gerstner holds that “You have to be fast
on your feet and adaptive, or else a strategy is useless”.
Whoever originally said this, it makes an important
point: a good strategy must be combined with strong
dynamic capabilities to be effective.
35According to Rumelt (2011: 7), a guiding policy
specifies the approach to dealing with the obstacles
called out in the diagnosis. Coherent actions are
feasible, coordinated actions diagnosed to carry out
the guiding policy.
36For presentational purposes, strategy can be
viewed as embedded in dynamic capabilities. They
are interdependent. In many cases, however, it is
helpful for strategy to be analytically separated. This
is the approach followed in the remainder of this
paper.
37McDonald’s is an excellent example of a firm that
has grown globally based on an ability to replicate and
manage assets in multiple jurisdictions.
38Ordinary in the sense of maintaining the status
quo (that is, not out of the ordinary) (Helfat & Winter,
2011: 1244).
39For instance, the most proficient manufacturer of
vacuum tubes with bountiful ordinary capabilities was
defeated, as were others in the vacuum tube industry,
by the invention and mass production of transistors.
However, in markets that are protected from com-
petition – possibly because of government regulations
or trade barriers, or which are small-scale – ordinary
capabilities may allow a company to be profitable and
grow reasonably well.
40Dynamic capabilities are generally required for the
transfer and adaptation of ordinary capabilities on a
global scale. However, when global markets are
relatively homogeneous, such scaling may not require
significant adaptation. The mere transfer of tech-
nologies (without adaptation) to different geographies
represents the extension of ordinary capabilities – one
step short of dynamic capabilities.
41Technical fitness is defined by how effectively a
capability performs its function, regardless of how well
the capability enables a firm to make a living (Teece,
2007: 1321).
42Of course, in many poor countries with extensive
state control of resources, competitive forces are weak,
and firms with ordinary capabilities can survive and
prosper if ordinary capabilities are rare.
43Benchmarkers often study “best of breed” or peerless
performers of particular functions (e.g., what can the
shipping department learn from Federal Express?).
44Bloom et al. (2012) identified 18 management
practice domains. These seem to represent particular
ordinary capabilities, as discussed below.
45The fast-food industry is another example,
although capabilities are perhaps not yet as complete
on a global basis.
46Nelson dates this development from the mid-
1970s.
47Cloud computing enables “ubiquitous, con-
venient, on-demand network access to a shared pool
of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks,
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal manage-
ment effort or service provider interactions” (Mell &
Grance, 2011). These resources can be provisioned
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to small businesses or across large multinational
corporations.
48Unpublished comments made at the Academy of
International Business meeting, Nagoya, Japan, 26 June
2011.
49Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) explored reasons
why ordinary capabilities were less prevalent in
developing countries. Their large-scale, cross-country
survey results suggested that an information gap was
perhaps the biggest contributor; managers were
generally not well-informed about how their own
practices compared to best practices. Specific
conditions that could also lead to poor management
practices in developing countries include weak product
market competition, state ownership, family-based
management, and poor business education.
50Intellectual capital, in particular, is generally harder
to develop, transfer, and imitate (Teece, 2000).
51Evolutionary fitness refers to how well the capability
enables a firm to make a living (Teece, 2009: 7).
Dynamic capabilities allow an organization to change
in a manner that supports evolutionary fitness. They
govern how new products and services are developed
and positioned, how new business models are created,
and how ordinary capabilities improve.
52For instance, an important function in drug
development is achieving regulatory approval. At
present, many major pharmaceutical companies have
well-developed processes (for running the approval
process). In time, however, such processes could
become standardized, and available from a business
service provider. When this occurs, a higher-order
capability in the pharmaceutical industry will become
a lower-order (ordinary) capability.
53There may be multiple niches available to a firm for
surviving, given the environment. The higher the
environmental complexity that can be handled by the
firm, the better the long-run performance.
54Winter (2003) approaches dynamic capabilities as
being rooted in higher-level change routines. The core
of a capability is patterned activity oriented to relatively
specific objectives (p. 992). He differentiates dynamic
capabilities from ad hoc problem-solving, and views a
dynamic capability as a skill or routine that must be
maintained (p. 994).
55Discovering and exploiting discrepancies in factor
prices across jurisdictions is an element of the
entrepreneurial function of the MNE.
56Drnevich and Kriauciunas (2011: 275) found that
firms may achieve higher relative performance by
increasing ordinary capability usage in stable environ-
ments and increasing dynamic capability usage in
dynamic environments.
57Many discussions of operations strategy drift into
what I think of as dynamic capabilities. Some scholars
see operations strategy as developing resources and
configuring processes so that there is good strategic fit
with the business environment (Van Mieghem, 2008:
18). In the fast-food industry, for example, ordinary
capabilities involve key performance indicator metrics,
training systems, motivation, monitoring, and so on.
Dynamic capabilities address figuring out new product
to put on the menu, new operating hours (e.g., late
night), and new locations (central vs suburban). These
are critical decisions in the MNE context.
58Simon (1969) defines three modes of coping with
the environment: passive insulation, reactive negative
feedback, and predictive adaptation. Miles and Snow
(1978) also lay out a taxonomy with respect to how
firms can adapt.
59Building organizations that possess and
appropriately exercise dynamic capabilities isn’t at all
easy. It’s not simply about standardization, ration-
alization, or centralization; these are more associated
with ordinary capabilities than with dynamic
capabilities. In the global context, dynamic capabilities
involve being sensitive to local markets and national
systems of innovation, while also achieving integration
across markets where scale allows and requires it.
60Fitness is somewhat akin to contingency theory,
and the alignment of organizational design with
context (Burns & Stalker, 1961).
61This is somewhat consistent with the revised
thinking of Hennart (2009).
62As Rugman and Verbeke (1993: 74–75) note, “a
substantial body of literature exists which suggests that
large MNEs are becoming increasingly independent
from individual countries; they use selective parts of
national diamonds to gain global advantages. In each
of these cases, anMNE’s core competence is considered
to be its ability to coordinate and control operations
which are globally dispersed as a result of a wide variety
of location advantages associated with industrial
nations or regions”.
63Of course, the advantages of complex coordination
being conducted inside the firm are featured in many
theories of the firm (e.g., Barnard, 1938; Hennart,
1977, 1982). However, the type of “coordination”
discussed here – coordination that involves orches-
trating co-specialized complements and intellectual
property – is rather different from what has been
featured before.
64Dierickx and Cool (1989) do not use the language
of time-cost tradeoffs; they speak of “time compression
diseconomies” (p. 1504). They appear to be getting at
the same idea.
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65As O’Reilly, Harreld, and Tushman (2009) note, this
is not only required, it is sometimes achieved.
66This is despite the fact that Oliver Williamson, one of
the pioneers of transaction cost thinking, wrote a good
deal about theM-form structure (e.g., Williamson, 1975).
67Headquarters management can perform an impor-
tant set of functions by promoting and protecting
organizational learning, co-specialized technology
transfer, and capability accumulation. Entrepreneurial
leadership can come from the parent or the
subsidiaries.
68The exception here is Chesbrough and Teece
(1996). However, this treatment gave insufficient
weight to capabilities.
69This formulation is based on Coase (1937).
Williamson (1985) frames the boundary choice issue
as one of minimizing both what he calls “governance”
costs and “production” costs. Governance costs
depend importantly on whether the task at hand
requires investment in idiosyncratic (transaction-specific)
assets.
70The Boeing 787 Dreamliner case is relevant here as
a counter-example. In designing a supply chain for its
new 787 Dreamliner passenger jet, Boeing decided
to rely far more than ever before on a global array
of suppliers to develop parts and subsystems.
Unfortunately, it also cut back its monitoring
capability, without having first ensured that all
suppliers had the requisite design and production
capabilities. Problems with inadequate components
led to a delay of more than three years (Kesmodel,
2011). The problems were not, at heart, contractual
ones; they arose more from capability deficiencies
than from opportunism.
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